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The EEC Merger Regulation: Preparing
For A Common European Market
I. INTRODUCTION
By January 1, 1993, the European economic revolution, which be-
gan in 1957 with the signing of the Treaty of Rome ("Treaty"), will
be complete.1 On that date, the individual markets of twelve Euro-
pean countries 2 will be transformed into the single, unified Common
Market, known. as the European Economic Community ("EEC"), co-
extensive with the boundaries of these twelve signatories ("Member
States") to the Treaty. The elimination of the economic barriers di-
viding these Member States requires the removal of certain legal bar-
riers and the establishment of a single legal and regulatory regime to
oversee the operation of the Common Market. In preparation for
1993, the EEC has promulgated a number of regulations, pursuant to
the spirit and letter of the Treaty, in order to establish consistent pol-
icies which are so vital to the success of this economic experiment.3
On September 21, 1990, the EEC took a substantial step towards
achieving regulatory consistency. On that date, a regulation promul-
gated by the Commission of the European Communities ("EC Com-
mission") 4 went into effect. This regulation requires all mergers,
acquisitions and joint ventures involving business organizations above
1. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY March 25, 1957,
298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC TREATY]. Article 8a of this treaty, which establishes
the December 31, 1992 deadline for complete integration of the European Community,
was added by the Single European Act. Single European Act, 1987 O.J. (L169) 1. For a
discussion of how this transformation directly affects European merger policy, see in-
fra notes 9-13.
2. The EC now consists of twelve European nations: Belgium, Luxembourg,
Denmark, France, Germany (which will include what was once East Germany),
Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom.
Kurt E. Markert, German Antitrust Law and the Internationalization of Markets, 64
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 897, 897 (1988).
3. There are four categories of legislation generated by the EC governing bodies:
Regulations, Directives, Decisions, Recommendations, and Opinions. Towards 1992, 2
Doing Business in Europe (CCH) 99-100(1990). "[Regulations] are directly applicable
in all Member States, with binding legal effect without the need for confirmation by
national parliaments." Id.
4. For a discussion of the EC institutions and their roles, see infra note 12.
a certain size to obtain Commission approval before becoming final.5
The EEC Merger Regulation is significant for two reasons. First,
the Commission intends to use the Regulation to police international
mergers and acquisitions within the EEC.6 These transactions are
growing in number as firms attempt to expand by combining in antic-
ipation of a large Common Market in 1993.7 Second, the Regulation
will further the goal of consistency in merger policy, as the Commu-
nity attempts to circumvent the confusing and inconsistent multitude
of national merger enforcement laws presently existing within the
Member States.8
The second part of this Comment recaps the short history of the
EEC since its inception in 1957, traces the development of the Merger
Regulation, and outlines the terms of the final version of the Regula-
tion as implemented. The third part of this Comment analyzes many
of the criticisms of the Regulation and suggests changes that would
effectively address many of these criticisms. The final part of this
Comment discusses the anticipated impact that the Regulation will
have on European competition law and provides some guidelines for
American lawyers who expect to encounter the Regulation on behalf
of their clients. In addition, this section examines the initial results
of the regulation in operation. This Comment concludes that the suc-
cess of the Regulation requires (1) that jurisdiction to clear and re-
view Community-wide mergers and acquisitions be vested solely in
the EC Commission, and (2) that the Regulation's provisions guide
the Commission in adopting a merger policy that adheres to the spirit
of the Treaty of Rome.
II. BACKGROUND
A. EC Regulation of Mergers and Acquisitions Since 1957
The development of a unified European merger policy began in
1957,9 when six European countries signed the Treaty of Rome. l0
5. See Council Regulation 4064/89, On the Control of Concentrations Between
Undertakings, 1989 O.J. (L 395)1.
6. See Paul D. Callister, Note, The December 1989 European Community Merger
Control Regulation: A non-EC Perspective, 24 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 97, 97 (1991) ("[T]he
new Regulation has international antitrust implications affecting mergers and other
transactions worldwide.").
7. "The total number of mergers in the European Community increased by 26
percent from'June 1989 to May 1990 over the previous year .... There were twice as
many acquisitions of EC firms by firms outside the EC compared to the preceding year
." Mergers Continue Upward Trend, EC Commission Notes in Annual Report,
[Jan.-June] Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA), at 1005 (June 28, 1991).
8. See infra note 74 and accompanying text.
9. EEC TREATY. Prior to this time, those persons schooled in the European tradi-
tion of laissez-faire government viewed merger regulation, and antitrust regulation in
general, as a uniquely American legal phenomenon. MILTON HANDLER ET AL., TRADE
REGULATION 21 (3d ed. 1990). In fact, the only semblance of European antitrust legis-
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The Treaty established the EEC, a unified European common market
within the boundaries of the Member States," and created the insti-
tutions authorized to carry out the spirit and the letter of the
Treaty.12 The general goal of these institutions is to establish and
implement policies conducive to the successful integration of the Eu-
ropean markets into a single competitive market.13
In response to the increasing concentration of market share and
the growing number of restrictive trade practices in all industrial sec-
tors throughout post-war Europe,14 the EC Commission attempted to
lation existed exclusively in Germany, where it had been imposed by United States au-
thorities after World War II. See infra note 46.
10. EEC TREATY. The original members of the EC were the United Kingdom,
West Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. Id. For a discussion
of the growth of membership within the EC, see 1 HANS SMrr & PETER HERzoG, THE
LAW OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY: A COMMENTARY ON THE EEC TREATY
P-8 to P-25 (8th ed. 1991).
11. EEC TREATY, arts. 1-2.
12. There are four institutions that govern the EC. EEC TREATY, art. 4(1). The
Council of Ministers, which consists of the Member States' foreign ministers, is the
legislative branch of the EC. Id. at art. 145. Administrative/executive functions are
carried out by the Commission of the European Communities ("EC Commission"),
which is headquartered in Brussels, Belgium. Id. at art. 155. The Court of Justice, lo-
cated in Luxembourg, is the EEC's Judicial branch. Id. at art. 164. The court reviews
the EC Commission's formal decisions and determines questions of EC law referred to
it by the national courts of Member States. Id. In order to expedite the judicial pro-
cess in the EC, the Council of Ministers recently created the Chamber of First In-
stance, which has original jurisdiction. 1989 O.J. (C 215)1. Finally, the Assembly, also
known as the European Parliament and located in Strasbourg, France, plays a limited
legislative role and often provides input into the Council's drafting of competition reg-
ulations. EEC TREATY, art. 137.
13. Two general goals permeate the Treaty. The first goal is the integration of the
Member States' individual economies, including the elimination of protectionist poli-
cies by Member States. EEC TREATY, arts. 9, 12. This also includes restrictive prac-
tices by individual business enterprises, or undertakings, which would interfere with
integration. Id. at arts. 85-86. The second goal, which defines the purpose of the first
goal, is the promotion of economic competition. Id. at art. 3(f). Although the estab-
lishment of this goal represents a victory for European proponents of a free market
system over advocates of a planned economy, the latter perspective has had an influ-
ence on the direction of EEC competition policy. BARRY E. HAWK, UNITED STATES,
COMMON MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST-A COMPARATIVE GUIDE 423-24
(1979). The ultimate goal of the EEC is to eliminate all barriers to trade, such as tar-
iffs, among the member States. EEC TREATY, art. 3(a)-(c). The EEC also attempts to
promote trade on the international level as a single economic unit. Id. at arts. 5-6.
The EC Commission negotiates at GATI' (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade)
conferences and, in the absence of special arrangements, non-members are subject to a
common external tariff imposed by the EEC. MOYES E. LEECH, THE INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL SYSTEM 1140-41 (3d ed. 1988). This Common Market is the West's largest trad-
ing entity in terms of geographic size and population, with over 300 million people. To-
wards 1992, 2 Doing Business in Europe (CCH), 102-700 (1990).
14. From June 1989 to May 1990, the chemical industry had the most mergers
gain control over this potentially anticompetitive phenomenon by ar-
ticulating a consistent merger policy under the terms of the Treaty. 15
Until the Merger Regulation became effective, EEC merger policy
had been based exclusively on Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty.16
1. The Use of Articles 85 and 86 to Enforce EEC Merger Policy
Article 85, the European counterpart to Section 1 of the Sherman
Act,17 prohibits "as incompatible with the Common Market: all
agreements between undertakings [entities engaged in commercial
activity]... and concerted practices which may affect trade between
Member States and which have as their object or effect the preven-
tion, restriction or distortion of competition within the Common
Market... ."18 Article 85 is much more specific than Section 1, how-
ever, in that it expressly includes an enumerated list of prohibited
business arrangements,19 and expressly excludes from its application
agreements "which contribute to improving the production of goods
or to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing con-
sumers a fair share of the resulting economic benefit ...."20
Article 86, which is roughly analogous to Section 2 of the Sherman
with 148, followed by the food industries, with 102 mergers, and the paper printing in-
dustries with 79 mergers. Mergers Continue Upward Trend EC Commission Notes in
Annual Report, [Jan.-June] Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA), at 1006 (June 28, 1991). The
percentage increases in these industries were 38, 34, and 29, respectively. Id. Although
these trends can be attributed to the anticipated Common Market, they are also due in
part to the post-war increase in trading volume on an international level. Fielding,
Foreword to DAVID L. PERROrT & ISTVAN POGANY, CURRENT ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS LAW, at vii (1988)[hereinafter Fielding, CURRENT ISSUES].
15. See infra notes 78-87 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
17. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). Section 1 of the Sherman Act states, in pertinent part,
that "[e]very contract, combination, in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
declared to be illegal." Id.
18. EEC TREATY, art. 85. An "undertaking" has been defined as "[a]ny natural or
legal person engaged in activities of an economic nature." 16(G) J. 0. VON KALINOW-
SKI, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION § 60.04 [2]
(1989).
19. In particular, Article 85(1) expressly prohibits concerted practices which fix
prices, restrict output, divide markets, in addition to concerted refusals to deal and ty-
ing arrangements. EEC TREATY art. 85. United States courts have had to construe
most of these prohibited practices from the broad language of Section 1 of the Sher-
man Act. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972)(market
division); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207 (1959)(concerted refusals
to deal); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (price-fixing), reh'g de-
nied, 310 U.S. 658 (1940).
20. EEC TREATY, art. 85(3). This exclusion, which is limited only to those restric-
tions that are "indispensable to the attainment of these objectives," precluded a debate
similar to that which has continued in the United States over whether Section I of the
Sherman Act should be construed as a per se rule of illegality. Id. Article 85 man-
dates a rule of reason, which is the alternative to the per se rule in the United States.
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Act,21 prohibits "[a]ny abuse by one or more undertakings of a domi-
nant position within the Common Market or in a substantial part of
it" to the extent it affects trade among Member States.22 Like Arti-
cle 85, Article 86 expressly provides a list of prohibited business ar-
rangements.2 3 However, only firms having a "dominant position
within the Common Market or a substantial part of it" are subject to
the prohibitions of Article 86.24 "Dominant position" has been con-
strued by the Court of Justice in much the same way that United
States courts have construed "monopoly power" under Section 2 of
the Sherman Act.25 A firm has a "dominant position" under Article
86 when it can "behave to an appreciable extent independently of its
competitors, its customers and ultimately of the consumers" and has
an "appreciable influence on the conditions under which... competi-
tion will develop, and in any case to act largely in disregard of it."26
A firm "abuses" its dominant position when its behavior "influence[s]
the structure of a market" in an anticompetitive manner.27
In 1966, the EC Commission took the position that Article 85 does
not apply to mergers.28 The Commission's decision reflected the ten-
dency that existed in the Common Market at that time of allowing,
21. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988). Section 2 of the Sherman Act states, in pertinent part:
"every person shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with
any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among
the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony .. " Id.
22. EEC TREATY, art. 86.
23. Specifically, Article 86 prohibits undertakings with a dominant market posi-
tion from imposing predatory pricing and other unfair trading terms, production limi-
tations injurious to consumers, price discrimination, and tying arrangements. Id.
24. Id.
25. See United States v. E.I. duPont, 351 U.S. 377 (1956) (holding that monopoly
power is the power to control prices or exclude competition in the relevant market).
26. Case 85/76, Hoffman-La Roche & Co. AG v. Commission, 1979 E.C.R. 461, 3
C.M.L.R. 211 (1980). In Hoffrnan-La Roche, the Court found that Hoffman-La Roche, a
manufacturer of blk vitamins, held a "dominant position" that allowed it to maintain
agreements with its customers "'which contain an obligation upon purchasers, or by
the grant of fidelity rebates offer them an incentive, to buy all or most of their re-
quirements exclusively, or in preference, from Hoffman-La Roche.'" Id. at 464 (quot-
ing Commission, 1976 O.J. (L 223) 27). The Court stated that Hoffman-La Roche's
dominant position resulted from, among other things: a market share ranging from
95% for vitamins B6 and H to 47% for vitamin A; the fact that Hoffman-La Roche was
the world's leading manufacturer of all vitamins; and high barriers to entry in the in-
dustry due to the long-term large investments required to enter the market. Id. at 479.
27. Id. at 475.
28. 1 J.0. VON KALINOWSKI, WORLD LAW OF COMPETITION (Unit B-European Eco-
nomic Community) § 7.02 (1982) [hereinafter WORLD LAW OF COMPETITION] (citing La
probleme de la comnentration dans le marchd commun, etude CEE, Serie Concurrence
No. 3 (1966)). This construction of Article 85 is consistent with the general non-appli-
cability of Section 1. of the Sherman Act to United States mergers.
and even encouraging, mergers in the hope of creating enterprises
sufficiently large to effectively compete in international markets.29
The decision, however, suggested that Article 86 could be applied to
mergers where an abuse of a dominant position resulted.3 0
For many years after its 1966 decision, the Commission utilized Ar-
ticle 86 to examine the compatibility of mergers with the Common
Market. In 1973, the Court of Justice sustained the Commission's ap-
plication of Article 86 to mergers. 3' However, the Court failed to dis-
cuss whether abuse of a dominant position arises from the merger
itself, or whether there has to be a further showing of an affirmative
threat to competition posed by the merger. The Commission has
since indicated that the latter is required.32
In 1981, the Commission changed its earlier position with regard to
the applicability of Article 85 to mergers and acquisitions when it
challenged an agreement between Philip Morris and Rembrandt
Group Ltd., the parent of a company owning a controlling interest in
a competing tobacco products manufacturer.3 3 Under the agreement,
Philip Morris would purchase half of Rembrandt Group's ownership
in its subsidiary, Rothmans Holdings, which itself owned 61.6% of
Rothman International, Philip Morris' competitor.34 After the Com-
mission objected to this agreement, the parties negotiated a revised
agreement, whereby Philip Morris purchased half of Rembrandt
Group's 61.6% interest in Rothman International, but only took a
24.9% voting interest in the competitor.3 5 The Commission did not
object to this new agreement, but some of Philip Morris' other com-
petitors, including British American Tobacco, challenged the agree-
ment in the Court of Justice.3 6 The Court of Justice upheld the
Commission's approval of the revised agreement, and held that,
29. Antitrust& Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 207, at A-3 (1965)(remarks of von der
Groeben, Commissioner of the Economic Community in Charge of Antitrust Affairs);
Memorandum of the Commission of the European Economic Community to the Gov-
ernments of the Member States, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH), No. 26, part 1 at 9 (1965).
30. WORLD LAW OF COMPETITION, supra note 28, § 7.02.
31. In Europemballage Corp. v. EEC Commission, 1973 E.C.R. 215, the Court of
Justice held that Article 3(f) of the Treaty of Rome, which provides for "the establish-
ment of a system insuring that competition in the Common Market is not distorted,"
allows the Commission to review mergers under the terms of Article 86.
32. Barry E. Hawk, The EEC Merger Regulation: The First Step Toward One-Stop
Merger Control, 59 ANTITRUsT L.J. 195, 197 n.10 (1990) [hereinafter Hawk, EEC Merger
Regulation].
33. See British-American Tobacco v. EEC Commission, 1987 E.C.R. 4487. The
Commission's reversal probably came in response to the limitations of Article 86, as
well as the slow progress that the Merger Regulation, which had been introduced by
the Commission in 1973, had been making toward implementation. Hawk, EEC Merger
Regulation, supra note 32, at 198. See also infra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
34. British-American Tobacco, 1987 E.C.R. 4489.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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under certain conditions, Article 85 applies to minority share acquisi-
tions between undertakings that remain independent.37 Following
the court's decision, the Commission employed Article 85 to chal-
lenge acquisitions of minority shareholdings in a competitor, as well
as joint bids for a competitor.38
Although Articles 85 and 86 were not specifically intended to apply
to merger enforcement, the conspicuous absence of any other provi-
sions in the Treaty of Rome addressing merger enforcement forced
the Commission to place heavy reliance on Articles 85 and 86 to es-
tablish a consistent merger policy. However, the language of Articles
85 and 86 made them unwieldy weapons of limited effectiveness for
merger control by the Commission. For example, Article 86 is appli-
cable only if at least one of the parties has a "dominant position"
prior to the transaction.39 Further, Article 85, as presently con-
strued, only applies to (1) acquisitions of minority shareholdings
where one of the conditions stated in British-American Tobacco is
met; (2) "joint acquisition of shares of a third firm"; and (3) acquisi-
tions where the seller retains a minority shareholding interest or
continued participation in the management of the company. 40
2. Merger Enforcement in the Member States
In addition to Community-wide merger regulation by the Commis-
sion, many of the member States have developed their own laws that
govern mergers occurring within their boundaries. Germany, France
and the United Kingdom have the most developed merger enforce-
ment regulations,4 1 but other countries have recently enacted their
37. Id at 4491. The court concluded that Article 85 applies to such agreements
when the shareholding agreement: (1) "results in legal or de facto control"; (2) "gives
the acquiror the possibility of later reinforcing its position"; (3) "provides for commer-
cial cooperation"; or (4) "requires the firms to take into consideration the other's inter-
est when determining commercial policy." Hawk, supra note 32, at 199.
38. In 1989, the Commission challenged a proposed acquisition by Danish Fur
Sales of a 35% stake in Hudson's Bay and Annings, its largest Community competitor.
New Developments, 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) V95,031 (Jan. 3, 1989). Because of the
challenge, the proposed acquisition was abandoned. Id In addition, the Commission
challenged joint bids in Plessey v. GEC/Siemens, and Argyll Group PLC v. Distillers
Co. PLC. See Hawk, EEC Merger Regulation, supra note 32, at 199 & n.20.
39. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
40. Hawk, EEC Merger Regulation, supra note 32, at 200. Article 85 does not apply
to public bids (tender offers), total mergers, passive investments, simple purchases of
business assets, or acquisitions of minority shareholdings in a noncompetitor. Id, The
limited applicability of Article 85 is probably the result of this limited interpretation of
its scope.
41. See infra notes 47-70 and accompanying text.
own laws for the regulation of mergers within their boundaries.42
Because most of the European merger regulation has taken place in
the context of highly internationalized markets,43 the national laws
defining the standard of merger review generally require the review-
ing bodies to consider both the internal and external competitive ef-
fects of a merger.44 However, these national merger laws are
endemic and usually reflect national economic goals and protectionist
policies, which often stray from competition-based principles. 45
Germany has the distinction of being the first European nation to
have regulations governing mergers within its boundaries.46 In 1957,
Germany replaced the interim antitrust laws implemented by post-
war occupational forces with the Act Against Restraints on Competi-
tion (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankngen, hereinafter
"GWB"),47 which created the powerful Federal Cartel Office. Under
the GWB, mergers are subject to government control where the com-
bined sales of the participating firms exceed DM 500 million.48 The
GWB defines "mergers" broadly, avoiding the limitations that exist
under Article 85.49
When proposed mergers meet GWB thresholds, notice must be
given to the Cartel Authority (Bundeskartellamt), Germany's anti-
trust agency within the Federal Cartel Office.5 0 The Cartel Author-
ity can then conduct an investigation to determine whether "a
market dominating position will be created or strengthened as a re-
sult of the merger." 51 A merger, although large enough to require
notification, will be approved if "the participating enterprises prove
42. See ivkfra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
43. Fielding, CURRENT IssuEs, supra note 14, at i-vii.
44. See infra notes 53, 57 & 70 and accompanying text.
45. Many of the national merger laws have been criticized for being protectionist,
in violation of the goal of the Treaty of Rome. Hawk, EEC Merger Regulation, supra
note 32, at 232. In addition, merger enforcement under these laws has frequently been
discriminatory when United States firms are involved. I&
46. HANDLER ET AL., supra note 9, at 21-22. For a discussion of the evolution of
post-WWII development of German antitrust laws, see 2 J. 0. VON KALINOWSKI,
WORLD LAw OF COMPETITION § 1.031] (Unit B-Western Europe)(1982).
47. Gesetz 2 gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankngen [Act Against Restraints of Compe-
tition], July 27, 1957, BGB1. I, 1081 [hereinafter GWB].
48. 1d § 24(8) No. 1 GWB.
49. Id. § 23 Nos. 1-5 GWB. A "merger" under GWB includes the acquisition of all
or a substantial part of the assets of another firm; the acquisition of shares of another
firm which equals or exceeds 25% of the firm's capital or 59% of its voting rights; an
agreement which forms or enlarges a combine ("Konzern") or by which an enterprise
operates for another enterprise; an interlocking directorate; and "every other combina-
tion or enterprises through which one or more enterprises can directly or indirectly
exercise a significant influence on another enterprise." Id
50. Id, § 23 GWB. Premerger notification is required if one of the parties (includ-
ing controlled affiliates) had worldwide sales revenues of at least DM 2 billion in the
preceding fiscal year or if two of the parties (including controlled affiliates) each had
worldwide sales revenues of at least DM 1 billion in the preceding fiscal year. Id.
51. Id. § 24(1), (2) GWB.
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that the merger will also lead to improvements in the conditions of
competition and that these improvements will outweigh the disad-
vantages of market domination." 52 Any improvement in Germany's
export trade as a result of a proposed merger will be considered a
factor that weighs against a loss of competition in the domestic
market.53
In France, the 1986 competition Ordinance ("Ordinance") autho-
rizes the French Minister of Economics and Finance to refer certain
transactions to the French Competition Council for further investiga-
tion of their effects on competition. 54 A merger which may have an-
ticompetitive effects will be permitted if its "contribution to
economic progress" outweighs its anticompetitive effects, "taking into
consideration the competitiveness of the firms in question in the light
of international competition."55 France does not have a mandatory
premerger notification requirement, although notification is recom-
mended if the merger is likely to be questioned by the Minister. 56
Thus, any action taken by the Council or Minister will occur after
the merger has been consummated.
France actively examines social and political factors, more so than
Germany or the United Kingdom, when examining a merger under
the Ordinance. 57 In making its determination, the Council may con-
sider factors such as "local employment, the maintenance of French
ownership of a company, increases in manufacturing efficiency and
capacity within France, and increases in research and development
budgets."58 The Council's decision, however, is not binding on the
Minister, who makes the final decision regarding appropriate reme-
52. Id
53. Id. § 24(3) GWB.
54. See X.A. de Mello, French Merger Law and Policy in the Wake of EEC Regula-
tion-A French View, 1988 FORDHAM CORP. LAW INSTIT. 29-9 (B. Hawk ed., 1989)(cit-
ing Articles 38-44 of the Ordonnance of December 1, 1986). The Minister many refer
transactions where the total French sales of all parties are at least Fr 7 billion or
where the parties and their affiliates have in the aggregate made over 25% of the sales,
purchases, or other transactions on a national market of goods, products, or services
substitutable for each other, or in a substantial part of such a market. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. Notification must be made within three months after completion of the
merger. Id, Upon notification, the Minister may refer the transaction to the Council
for further investigation, declare that he does not object to the merger, or remain si-
lent, in which case the merger will be automatically cleared after a two month waiting
period. Id.
57. See Hawk, EEC Merger Regulation, supra note 32, at 230.
58. Id.
dies, such as divestiture. 59
In the United Kingdom, the Fair Trading Act of 197360 authorizes
the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, acting on the advice of
the Office of Fair Trading, to investigate and refer to the Monopolies
and Merger Commission (hereinafter "MMC") mergers6 l that attain
at least a twenty-five percent market share6 2 or involve an acquisi-
tion of gross assets of at least £5 million.63 The Secretary of State has
six months to refer a merger that meets or exceeds these threshold
levels to the MMC for investigation, and the MMC has up to five
years to conduct its investigation.6 4 Because the MMC has no execu-
tive power, it can only recommend to the Secretary of State action
against an anticompetitive merger.65
Like France, the United Kingdom has never adopted a mandatory
premerger notification requirement.66 However, the United King-
dom recommends notification where the proposed merger exceeds
the review thresholds.6 7 In fact, if the Office of Fair Trading investi-
gates an unreported merger that qualifies for review, it will consider
the failure to notify.68
Although the Office of Fair Trading bases its merger review pri-
marily upon competition criteria, it may also consider noncompeti-
tion factors, with the determination reflecting whether the merger
"operates or may be expected to operate against the public inter-
est."69 The Office of Fair Trading generally views mergers favorably,
with the exception of sizable mergers, in an effort to decrease the
59. See F. Jenny, French Competition Policy in Perspective, 1987 CORPORATE LAW
INSTITUTE: NORTH AMERICAN AND CoMMoN MARKET ANTITRUST AND TRADE LAWS
314-15 (B. Hawk ed., 1988).
60. Fair Trading Act of 1973, reprinted in 3 OECD, GUIDE TO LEGISLATION OF RE-
STRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES (1979) [hereinafter Fair Trading Act].
61. Under the Fair Trading Act, a merger occurs when "two or more enterprises
cease to be distinct." Id. § 64(1).
62. Id. § 65(1)(a).
63. Id, § 65(1)(b).
64. Id. § 69(1).
65. Hawk, EEC Merger Regulation, supra note 32, at 229.
66. Id at 229 n.107.
67. Id.
68. See id On April 1, 1990, the United Kingdom implemented a voluntary pre-
merger review procedure, which allows parties to file a standard "Merger Notice" with
the Office of Fair Trading. Id. Upon notification, the merger will receive immunity
from reference to the Monopolies and Merger Commission, subject to limited excep-
tions, if the Office does not refer the proposed merger to the Commission within 20
working days of notification. Id.
69. Fair Trading Act, supra note 60, § 72. The factors that the Office of Fair Trad-
ing and the Commission on Monopolies and Merger consider in determining whether a
merger "operates or may operate against the public interest" include competition, use
of resources, balance of payments, conflict between businesses, interests of the bidding
company, prospects of the target company if the merger does not go through, employ-
ment, and regional aspects. Id. § 84. The definition of "public.interest" also includes
"the desirability ... of maintaining and promoting competitive activity in markets
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number of small inefficient enterprises in most British industries.70
More recently, other European countries have begun to implement
national merger enforcement regulations. For instance, Portugal and
Spain have adopted regulations which emphasize competition consid-
erations.71 In contrast, recently created merger regulations in Ire-
land take into account both competition and noncompetition
criteria.72 In 1990, Italy approved a proposed merger law that largely
emulates the EEC Merger Regulation's premerger notification proce-
dure and substantive standards of review.73
Combined with the impracticality of applying Articles 85 and 86 on
a Community level, this complex maze of national merger regulation,
which has proven to be both redundant and contradictory,74 illus-
trates the preference for a uniform merger policy for the Common
Market. A uniform merger policy has become a necessity in light of
the trend toward internationalization of mergers and acquisitions
within the EEC.
B. Development of the EEC Merger Regulation
The Merger Regulation began in 1973 as a proposal designed to
achieve two goals. First, the Regulation would add some uniformity
outside the United Kingdom on the part of producers of goods, and suppliers of goods
and services in the United Kingdom." I&
70. See generally OECD, GUIDE TO LEGISLATION ON RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRAC-
TICES, UNITED KINGDOM § 3.2 at 25-27 (1973)(summary of proposed acquisition activi-
ties of the Glaxco Group Ltd. by either Beecham Group Ltd. or the Boots Co., Ltd.).
71. For a discussion of Spanish merger legislation, see 16(G) VON KALiNOWSKI,
supra note 18, § 63.02 [14]. The Restrictive Practices Register requires notification of a
merger within one month if the merger results in more than 30% market share. Id
However, failure to notify results only in monetary penalties against the merging par-
ties, not nullification of the merger. Id.
72. 1I § 63.02 [9] (citing the Mergers, Takeovers and Monopolies Control Act of
June 1978). The Act applies if each of the merging entities maintains in excess of
either £ 1,250,000 in assets or £ 2,500,000 in turnover in the previous year. Id, The
merging parties must notify the Minister for Industry and Commerce, who may refer
the case to the Examiner of Restrictive Practices. Id.
73. See Italy Enacts First Statute to Establish Antitrust Regime, [July-Dec.] Anti-
trust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA), at 518 (Oct. 4, 1990). The new Italian Antitrust Au-
thority requires premerger notification of a proposed merger, acquisition, takeover, or
joint venture, where the involved companies have a combined turnover of at least $450
million in Italy or where any one of the firms being acquired exceeds $45 million in
Italian turnover. Id.
74. "Parties to many cross-border transactions must dodge through a thicket of
overlapping and sometimes inconsistent notification requirements, waiting periods,
substantive review standards, and negotiations with antitrust authorities in various
countries." Hawk, EEC Merger Regulation, supra note 32, at 232.
to the regulation of mergers within the Community.75 Second, the
Regulation would address the inadequacies of Articles 85 and 86 as a
means of merger control.76 Due to the emergence of mergers and ac-
quisitions as the primary means for companies to compete both inter-
nationally and within the post-1993 European market,77 the EC
Commission perceived these two goals as prerequisites to a successful
integration of the EEC markets.78
1. The Evolution of the Draft Merger Regulation
On October 31, 1973, the Commission published the first draft regu-
lation on merger control.79 The numerous legal and political obsta-
cles facing the draft regulationO indefinitely delayed approval by the
Council of Ministers. 81 Frustrated by the delay, the Commission in-
creased its merger control activity, relying upon the tenuous inter-
pretations of Articles 85 and 86.82 Eventually, the Member States'
resistance to the draft regulation became overshadowed by the reali-
zation that the case-by-case evolution of Article 85 and 86 would fore-
stall a consistent and uniform merger control policy.8 3 In addition,
the imminent arrival of 1993 and the prospect of entering 1993 with-
75. See Callister, supra note 6, at 97 & n.3. "Article 3 of the [proposed] regulation
gives to the Commission, subject to review by the Court of Justice, sole power to make
decisions prohibiting a merger or exempting in it under Art. 1, para. 3." WORLD LAW
OF COMPETITION, supra note 28, § 7.02 n.8.
76. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
77. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. See Callister, supra note 6, at 132.
78. See Hawk, EEC Merger Regulation, supra note 32, at 197. In light of increasing
cross-border merger activity, the Commission perceived a real danger in the "benign
neglect" that had characterized the Member States' approach to merger enforcement,
as reflected in the absence of any merger control provisions in the Treaty of Rome.
See id. at 196.
79. Commission Proposal for a Regulation (EEC) of the Council on the Control of
Concentrations between Undertakings, 1973 0. J. (C92)1.
80. The debate over the draft regulation centered on the supremacy of Commu-
nity law over the Member States' national legislation. See Markert, supra note 2, at
922. In 1969, the Court of Justice had indicated that Community merger law would
take precedence over national legislation, stating that Community and national anti-
trust law would apply concurrently, but that the application of national law cannot
"jeopardize the uniform application throughout the Common Market of the Commu-
nity cartel rules or the full effect of the measures taken under such rules." Case 14/
68, Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt, [1967-70 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 8057, at 7856 (1969). However, this inconclusive decision did not quell the re-
luctance of Member States to relinquish power to the EEC. "The Commission's at-
tempt to attribute to the planned regulation such a sweeping preempting force vis-a-vis
the national merger control laws of the member states, thereby excluding even the ap-
plication of a national law notification requirement, has led to critical reactions ... not
only in the legal literature, but also politically." Markert, supra note 2, at 928-29.
81. Under Article 235 of the Treaty of Rome, which is the legal basis for the
Merger Regulation, approval by the Council of Ministers must be unanimous. EEC
TREATY, art. 235.
82. Hawk, EEC Merger Regulation, supra note 32, at 198.
83. Id at 200-01. "The Commission successfully used its threat to challenge more
acquisitions under Articles 85 and 86 and to force Council action on the proposed
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out an established merger policy forced the Member States, through
the Council, to work with the Commission in finalizing a merger
regulation.s 4
In December of 1987, one month after the Court of Justice upheld
the Commission's application of Article 85 to mergers,8 5 the Council
of Ministers and the EC Commission agreed in principle to an
amended proposal for exclusive Community merger regulation. 86
Two years later, the Council issued the final draft of the Merger Reg-
ulation,87 sixteen years after the Commission had published the first
draft.
2. Significant Changes in the Draft Merger Regulation
The changes in the Regulation that occurred over the years of ne-
gotiation are too numerous to set forth in full.88 However, a few
stand out as significant pieces of legislative history that may be valua-
ble in predicting the Commission's future course of action. The first
important change was the deletion of Article 2(4) from the final
draft.89 Article 2(4) would have authorized the Commission to clear
anticompetitive mergers on public policy grounds. Such a provision,
based on non-competition factors, would have subjected parties to the
Merger Regulation." Icl See also John E. Ferry, The Future of Merger Control in the
EEC, 2 ANTITRUST 12 (1988).
84. See UY, Geman Postures on EC Merger Control Can Lead to Two-Tiered Re-
view of Mergers, [Jan.-July] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA), at 937 (June 29,
1989)("The momentum of 1992 had 'brought to a head' the 16-year-old debate on
merger control"). It has also been suggested that, in addition to realizing the need to
oversee the growth of merger activity, the Council wanted to protect European mar-
kets against acquisitions by firms outside of the EEC. Patrick E. Thieffry, The Euro-
pean Integration and Transnational Disputes, 388 PRAC. L. INsT. 153, 158 (1990). Not
only is this contrary to the stated goals of both the Merger Regulation and the Treaty
of Rome, see supra note 13, it is also unlikely that the Commission will use the Regu-
lation in this manner.
85. Joined cases nos. 142 and 156184, British-American Tobacco v. Commission,
[1987-88 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1 14,405 (1987).
86. Amended Proposal for a Council Regulation (EEC) on the Control of Concen-
trations Between Undertakings, 1988 O.J. (C 130)4.
87. Council Regulation 4064/89 on the Control of Concentrations Between Under-
takings, 1989 O.J. (L 395) 1.
88. Compare Commission Proposal for a Regulation (EEC) of the Council on the
Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings, 1973 O.J. (C 92) 1, with Amended
Proposal for a Council Regulation (EEC) on the Control of Concentrations Between
Undertakings, 1988 O.J. (C 130) 4 and Council Regulation 4064/89 on the Control of
Concentrations Between Undertakings, 1989 O.J. (L 395) 1.
89. Compare Amended Proposal for a Council Regulation (EEC) on the Control of
Concentrations Between Undertakings, 1988 O.J. (C 130) 4 with Council Regulation
4064/89 on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings, 1989 O.J. (L 395) 1.
vagaries of European politics and exposed the Commission to political
pressure exerted by Member States still maintaining protectionist
economic policies. The elimination of Article 2(4) represents a move
towards a competition-based merger policy that the Member States,
as well as the Commission, should recognize.90
The "Dutch Clause"9 1 and the "German Clause"9 2 were added to
the Regulation in response to the concerns of Member States with
either very weak or very strong national merger control regula-
tions.9 3 The "Dutch Clause" allows a Member State to request Com-
mission review of a merger that does not fall within the Regulation
because it lacks "Community dimension" but "creates or strengthens
a dominant position as a result of which effective competition would
be significantly impeded within the territory of that Member
State."94 This provision allows those Member States without estab-
lished national merger laws to avail themselves of the Commission's
services in implementing national merger control.95
The "German Clause," on the other hand, permits those Member
States with strong merger control legislation to retain power over
mergers that affect markets within their boundaries.96 Under this
90. For an assessment of how the Commission has implemented a competition-
based policy under the Regulation, see infra note 266 and accompanying text. The role
that noncompetition criteria plays in the Member States' merger laws varies. The
United Kingdom and Germany consider only competition-based factors, while France,
Spain and Portugal consider both competition and noncompetition factors. See infra
notes 45-74 and accompanying text. See also Hawk, supra note 32, at 228.
91. Council Regulation 4064/89 on the Control of Concentrations Between Under-
takings, art. 22, 1989 O.J. (L 395) 11-12.
92. Council Regulation 4064/89 on the Control of Concentrations Between Under-
takings, art. 9, 1989 O.J. (L 395) 7.
93. See infra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
94. Council Regulation 4064/89. on the Control of Concentrations Between Under-
takings, art. 9, 1989 O.J. (L 395) 11-12. For a discussion of how the Court of Justice has
interpreted "dominant position," see infra note 26 and accompanying text. See also in-
fra note 162 and accompanying text.
95. Borrie Offers Assessment of EC Policies on Merger Control, UK Enforcement
Trends, [Jan.-July] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA), at 134 (July 27, 1989). Mem-
ber States with notably little merger control regulation include Belgium, Denmark,
Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. Hawk, EEC Merger Regulation,
supra note 32, at 227. These countries had advocated broader Commission jurisdiction,
in terms of a lower threshold for invocation of the Regulation. Ld. Within four years
of the Regulation's adoption, the Council of Ministers will review the threshold and is
expected to lower it. EC Practitioners Advise Colleagues on Pitfalls of Merger Control
Regulation, [Jan.-June] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA), at 673 (May 9, 1991). At
that time the "Dutch Clause" will no longer be effective. Council Regulation 4064/89
on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings, arts. 1(3), 22(6), 1989 O.J. (L
395) 3, 12.
96. Within the EEC, France, Germany and the United Kingdom have the strong-
est merger control legislation. Hawk, supra note 32, at 228. The German Clause (Arti-
cle 9) was included in the Regulation at the insistence of Germany, which wanted to
preserve the control of its merger authorities over concentrations that threatened local
markets. EC Council of Ministers Adopts Regulation to Control Acquisitions, [Jan.-
July] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA), at 22 (Jan. 4 1990).
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provision, a Member State, within three weeks of notification, may
inform the Commission that the proposed transaction threatens com-
petition in a "distinct market" within the boundaries of that Member
State. 97 If the Commission'determines that there is in fact a "distinct
market" within the Member State, it may review the transaction it-
self or refer the proposal to the Member State, which may then apply
its own national merger laws.98
Through periods of both dormancy and intense negotiation, the
Regulation has evolved into a compromise reflecting the concerns
and influences of all of the Member States.99 For companies plan-
ning to implement a merger in Europe, the Regulation provides an
alternative to the latticework of national regulation and the uncer-
tain application of Articles 85 and 86.100 For the Commission, the
Regulation relieves it from having to apply the strained interpreta-
tions of those Articles. Yet, the Regulation is not the final word on
EEC merger policy. Rather, it is a mere framework for the develop-
ment of European merger policy, and on a larger scale, European
competition policy.
C. An Overview of the Regulation
The Regulation consists of a preamble and twenty-five articles
which govern every aspect of the premerger notification procedure,
from the scope of the Regulation's coverage to the protection of the
merging parties' business secrets.' 0 ' Although the articles appear to
be very specific, there are a number of analytical difficulties underly-
ing the language contained in the provisions. The following analysis
illustrates some of these difficulties and presents the articles in a for-
mat which will be useful for applying the Regulation to actual
merger situations.
97. Council Regulation 4064/89 on the Control of Concentration Between Under-
takings, 1989 O.J. (L 395) 7. See also infra note 159 and accompanying text.
98. Council Regulation 4064/89 on the Control of Concentrations Between Under-
takings, art. 9(3), 1989 O.J. (L 395) 7.
99. "The adoption of the new Merger Regulation by the Council of Ministers rep-
resents a long sought after victory by the Commission in its efforts to strengthen and
centralize merger control in the EEC." Hawk, EEC Merger Regulation, supra note 32,
at 232.
100. See supra notes 17-40, 74 and accompanying text.
101. See generally Council Regulation 4064/89 on the Control of Concentrations Be-
tween Undertakings, 1989 O.J. (L 395) 1-12.
1. The Merger Regulation's Preamble
The thirty-one declarations within the Regulation's preamble ex-
press the intent of the Council of Ministers regarding the role of the
merger vetting process in "the achievement of the aims of the Treaty
establishing the European Economic Community."'0 2 Most of the
declarations summarize the contours of the Regulation regarding
scope, jurisdiction and procedure, while others explain the general
goals of the Treaty of Rome as applied to mergers and acquisitions.l0 3
In the preamble, the Council also specifies the legal basis of the Reg-
ulation under the Treaty. 0 4 Because the Regulation encompasses a
wider variety of mergers than do Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of
Rome,105 the Council principally based the legality of the Regulation
upon Articles 3(f) and 235, and not solely upon Article 87, of the
Treaty.106
2. The Scope of the Merger Regulation
Collectively, the Articles that define the scope of the Regulation
indicate that the regulation only governs "large multi-country trans-
actions involving very large firms."'1 7 In order for the Regulation to
apply, a merger must fall within the definition of a "concentration"
under Article 3(1).108 A concentration arises where: (1) "two or
more previously independent undertakings merge"; or (2) "one or
more undertakings," or "one or more persons already controlling at
least one undertaking 'acquires' direct or indirect control of the
whole or parts of one or more other undertakings."109 "Control"
may be acquired by the "purchase of securities or assets, by contract
102. Id. at 1. The Regulation's preamble also recognizes the importance of "eco-
nomic and social cohesion" to the success of the Community, as stated in the Treaty of
Rome and the necessity of "legal certainty [to] the validity of transactions" within the
Community. Id, at 1-2. The EC Commission uses the term "cohesion" "to describe the
EC's commitment to making sure that poorer EC countries do not get left behind eco-
nomically by creation of the single market." Mergers Continue Upward Trend, EC
Commission Notes in Annual Report, [Jan.-June] Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA), at 1005
(June 28, 1991).
103. See Council Regulation 4064/89 on the Control of Concentrations Between Un-
dertakings, 1989 O.J. (L 395) 1-3.
104. Id
105. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
106. Council Regulation 4064/89 on the Control of Concentration Between Under-
takings, 1989 O.J. (L 395) 1. Article 235 of the Treaty empowers the Council of Minis-
ters to take appropriate measures necessary to achieve Community objectives where
the Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, EEC TREATY, art. 235, while Article
3(f) calls for "the institution of a system ensuring that competition in the Common
Market is not distorted." Id. Article 87 empowers the Commission and the Council to
implement the competition rules in Articles 85 and 86. Id. at art. 87.
107. Hawk, EEC Merger Regulation, supra note 32, at 201.
108. Council Regulation 4064/89 on the Control of Concentrations Between Under-
takings, art. 3(1), 1989 O.J. (L 395)4.
109. Id.
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or by any other means" that "confer the possibility of exercising deci-
sive influence on an undertaking . ,,*"11o Although the Regulation
specifies how a person or undertaking gains "control," it does not
elaborate on its definition of "decisive influence."l
In addition to being a "concentration," the merger must have a
"Community dimension" in order for the Regulation to apply." 2
"Community dimension" is defined in terms of certain threshold
levels above which all proposed mergers are required to comply with
the Regulation's provisions.11 3 A proposed merger has a Community
dimension where the aggregate worldwide turnover of the parties is
greater than five billion ECU (approximately $6.5 billion), and the
aggregate Community-wide turnover of at least two of the parties is
greater than ECU 250 million, unless each of the parties concerned
achieves more -than two-thirds of its aggregate Community turnover
within the same Member State." 4
The Regulation defines "aggregate turnover" as an undertaking's
net sales in the preceding financial year, excluding: (1) sales of prod-
ucts and services that do not constitute the undertaking's "ordinary
activities"; (2) any taxes "directly related to turnover," including
value added taxes; and (3) intrafirm sales and transfers.ll5 If the
merger consists of an acquisition of only a part of one undertaking by
another (such as the acquisition of only some of the assets of an un-
dertaking or the acquisition of all of the stock of a subsidiary of an
undertaking), the aggregate turnover of the acquired undertaking is
limited to the sales relating to the acquired part." 6 Where the un-
110. Id. art. 3(3), at 4. Financial institutions, such as banks and insurance compa-
nies, which acquire shares for resale do not fall within the definition of a "concentra-
tion," as long as they do not exercise the voting rights of those securities, or exercise
them only with the purpose of preparing them for resale, in whole or in part, and actu-
ally do resell them within one year. Id. art. 3(5)(a), at 4.
111. See infra notes 186-89 and accompanying text.
112. Council Regulation 4064/89 on the Control of Concentrations Between Under-
takings, art. 1(1), 1989 O.J. (L 395) 3.
113. Id art 1(2), at 3. Even if the undertakings proposing a merger are based
outside the Community, the Regulation will apply if they meet the threshold levels,
since the threshold levels are based upon "products sold and services provided to un-
dertakings or consumers." I& art. 5(1), at 5.
114. Id, art. 1(2), at 3. Setting these threshold levels was one of the last barriers to
approval of the Regulation by the Council of Ministers, and will be reviewed by the
Council sometime before December 21, 1993. Id. art. 1(3), at 3.
115. Id. arts. 5(1), 5(4), at 5. The aggregate turnover of an undertaking also in-
cludes the net sales of any undertakings controlling or being controlled, either directly
or indirectly, by the undertaking. Id. art. 5(4), at 5.
116. Id. arts. 5(2), at 5. However, if two or more parts of an undertaking's business
are sold to the same acquiring undertaking within a two-year period, the acquisitions
dertakings involved in the concentration are participating in a joint
venture, aggregate turnover does not include sales of products or
services between the undertakings and their joint venture.117 The
net sales of the joint venture to third parties will be apportioned
equally among the undertakings involved in the concentration.118
The Regulation provides a separate definition of "Community di-
mension" for financial institutions. A concentration of financial insti-
tutions achieves a Community dimension where the institutions'
aggregate assets exceed ECU 5 billion and the assets of at least two of
the institutions exceed ECU 250 million when multiplied by the per-
centage of the institutions' loans and advances made to Community
residents.119 The thresholds of insurance companies are measured by
the value of gross premiums received and receivable worldwide, as
well as from Community residents.120
3. Notification to the EC Commission
If a proposed merger meets both the "concentration" and "Commu-
nity dimension" definitions, the proponents of the proposed merger
must notify the EC Commission within one week after "the conclu-
sion of the agreement, or the announcement of the public bid, or the
acquisition of a controlling interest," whichever occurs first.121 Ex-
cept for public bids, the concentration cannot be put into effect
"either before its notification or within the first three weeks follow-
ing its notification."122 If the concentration involves a merger or ac-
of those parts will be considered a single transaction occurring on the date of the most
recent transaction. Id
117. Id. art. 5(5)(a), at 5.
118. Id. art. 5(5)(b), at 5-6.
119. I art. 5(3)(a), at 5. These numbers are reached by applying one-tenth of the
limitation amount found in art. 1(2)(a) and art. 1(2)(b), multiplied by the ratio between
loans and advances.
120. I art. 5(3)(b), at 5.
121. Id. art. 4(1), at 4. The Commission may impose fines of between ECU 1,000
and ECU 25,000 for failing to file a timely notification with the Commission. Id, art.
14(1), (2), at 9. ECU 25,000 represents a cap of 10% of aggregate turnover calculated in
art. 5.
122. Id, art. 7(1), at 6. The Commission may, however, extend this waiting period
or take other interim measures if, upon initial investigation, it determines that such
measures are necessary to "ensure the full effectiveness of any decision taken later."
Id art. 7(2), at 6. On the other hand, the Commission may also shorten this waiting
period, upon application of the parties, "in order to prevent serious damage to one or
more of the undertakings concerned by a concentration or to a third party." Id art.
7(4), at 6. Upon notification, public bids may be completed prior to the expiration of
the waiting period, as long as the offeree does not exercise any voting rights attached
to the acquired securities. Id art. 7(3), at 6. Upon application to the Commission, how-
ever, the offeree may exercise these rights in order to maintain the full value of the
investment. Id Where a concentration has been completed prior to a Commission de-
cision, the Commission may order divestiture or any other remedial measures, includ-
ing fines of up to 10% of the undertakings' aggregate annual turnover and/or up to
ECU 100,000 per day. Id. at arts. 8(4), 14(2) & 15(2)(b), at 6-7, 9, and 9-10 respectively.
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quisition of joint control, the parties to the concentration are
required to file a joint notification with the Commission.123 Other-
wise, the acquiring party is solely required to file the notification.12 4
Notification is satisfied by submission of the Notification Form.125
The Notification Form consists of eight sections which request an ex-
tensive amount of data regarding the involved undertakings, the pro-
posed merger, and the market(s) in which they operate.126 The first
four sections request general background information of the under-
takings proposing the concentration. 12
Sections 5 through 7 solicit detailed information on the relevant
markets, the effect of the transaction on those markets, and the ef-
fect on the Community as a whole.128 Section 5 asks for specific mar-
ket information, including a definition of the relevant product
markets, as defined by the demand-substitution test,129 and any mar-
kets which will be directly or indirectly affected by the
concentration. 130
The Commission's remedial powers over foreign firms could raise jurisdictional and
comity problems.
123. Id, at art. 4(2), at 4-5. Parties required to submit a joint notification must ap-
point a joint representative and provide a Brussels address for service of process.
Hawk, EEC Merger Regulation, supra note 32, at 215.
124. Council Regulation 4064/89 on the Control of Concentrations Betweeen Un-
dertakings, art. 4(2), 1989 O.J. (L 395) 5. A party making a tender offer, for example,
would be solely required to notify the Commission.
125. For the text of the Notification Form, see Council Regulation 2367/90 on the
Notifications, Time Limits, and Hearings Provided for in Council Regulation (EEC)
No. 4064/89 on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings, Annex 1, 1990
O.J. (L 219) 11-18.
126. The first seven sections pertain to substantive information, I& at 13-18, while
the eighth section requires the notifying parties to submit a signed declaration verify-
ing the information provided. Id, at 18. The Commission will not consider a notifica-
tion to be complete until the filing parties have fully complied with the requests in the
Notification Form, or have substantially complied and have given "good reasons" for
their inability to fully comply. See Hawk, EEC Merger Regulation, supra note 32, at
235.
127. Council Regulation 2367/90 on the Notifications, Time Limits and Hearings
Provided for in Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89 on the Control of Concentra-
tions Between Undertakings, Annex 1, 1990 O.J. (L 219) 13-14.
128. Id at 15-18.
129. The parties must describe the products and services included in each product
market and must justify the inclusion of those products and services and the exclusion
of others. Id, at 15-16.
130. Id. The affected markets may be of any geographic size within the Community
(including the Community as a whole or any of its Member States) that can be appro-
priately considered a distinct market. Id at 15. For each of these affected markets,
the notifying parties are required to supply detailed information covering the last
three years, including the size of the market, the turnover of each of the parties within
those markets, the market shares of each of the parties and those of their competitors
Section 6 requires the undertakings to estimate and categorize the
total costs of entry for a "significant viable competitor" into each af-
fected market, including the amount of excess capacity, the existence
and details of cooperative agreements and the degree of vertical inte-
gration of the parties.131 This section also requires parties to give a
detailed description of the barriers to entry into each affected mar-
ket, any significant entries into those markets in the last five years,
and the "course of technological development.., over an appropriate
time period" in each affected market. 3 2 Further, this section re-
quires information on the growth phases as well as the supply and
demand structures of each affected market.133
Finally, Section 7 requests a general description of the anticipated
effect of the transaction on "the fundamental objectives of the Euro-
pean Community, including the strengthening of the Community's
economic and social cohesion."134 This description must allow the
Commission to assess the competitive environment, as well as the ef-
fect on the welfare of consumers and technological progress.135
The parties must also include any documents created in anticipa-
tion of the proposed concentration.' 3 6 This documentary supplemen-
tation must include any reports prepared by or for the parties for the
purpose of evaluating the competitive effect of the proposed
transaction.137
4. The Commission's Review of Notified Regulations
Upon notification, the Commission will examine concentrations
"with a view to establishing whether or not they are compatible with
the common market."138 The Commission can approve only those
concentrations that do not "create or strengthen a dominant position
as a result of which the maintenance or development of effective
(with at least ten percent market share) within those markets, the history of price
changes by the parties, the quantity of imports into and exports out of the Common
Market of products within those markets, and the existence of tariff restrictions on
those imports and exports. Id. at 15-16.
131. Id at 17.
132. Id
133. Id
134. Id at 18.
135. Id
136. Id at 11-12.
137. Id.
138. Council Regulation 4064/89 on the Control of Concentrations Between Under-
takings, art. 2(1), 1989 O.J. (L 395) 3. The Regulation lists a number of factors to be
considered in determining the acceptability of the concentration. Id These factors
emphasize market structure; the market power of the involved undertakings; the op-
portunities of access available to suppliers and consumers; any barriers to entry, supply
and demand trends in the involved markets; competitive technical and economic devel-
opments; and actual or potential competition form the- involved undertakings, both
within and without the Community. Id
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competition would be significantly impeded in the common market
or in a substantial part of it."139
The Commission has one month from receipt of the notification to
determine whether it wishes to initiate a formal investigation of the
concentration.140 If the Commission determines in a recorded deci-
sion that a notified concentration does not fall within the scope of the
Regulation, 141 or that the concentration "does not raise serious
doubts as to its compatibility with the common market,"'142 the Com-
mission must notify the involved undertakings and Member States of
its determination "without delay."'143 A concentration will be pre-
sumed compatible with the Common Market (and therefore cleared)
if the combined market share of the undertakings concerned "does
not exceed 25% either in the common market or in a substantial part
of it."144
If, on the other hand, the Commission decides that the concentra-
tion "raises serious doubts as to its compatibility with the common
market," it will initiate further investigation of the concentration.145
These proceedings must be completed and a decision announced
within four months of its decision to initiate a formal investigation.146
The Commission may revoke a prior clearance of a concentration
where "the declaration of compatibility is based on incorrect informa-
tion for which one of the undertakings concerned is responsible," or
where one of the conditions of its decision has not been met.147
139. Id art. 2(3), at 3-4. The Commission must also consider the views of manage-
ment, workers's representatives and third parties "showing a legitimate interest," and
give them an opportunity to be heard. Id. at 2.
140. Id. art. 10(1), at 8. If, within three weeks of notification, a Member State re-
quests referral of the transaction to its authorities for investigation of the competitive
effects of the concentration in a "distinct market" within that Member State, see infra
notes 142-43 and accompanying text, this period is extended to six weeks. Council
Regulation 4064/89 on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings, art. 9(2),
1989 O.J. (L 395) 7.
141. Id, art. 6(1)(a), at 6.
142. Id. art. 6(1)(b), at 6.
143. I& art. 6(2), at 6.
144. Id. art. 6(2), at 2.
145. Id art. 6(1)(c), at 6.
146. Id, arts. 10(2), 10(3), at 8. This is an outside deadline and the Commission must
clear concentration as soon as it appears that any serious doubts are removed, "particu-
larly as a result of modification made by the undertakings concerned." Id art. 10(2), at
8. However, the four month time period may be extended indefinitely where one of
the parties has caused the investigation to be delayed. Id. art. 10(4), at 8.
147. Id art. 8(5), at 7. The Commission may also impose fines of up to 10% of the
undertakings's aggregate annual turnover and/or up to ECU 100,000 per day for failing
to comply with a conditional clearance. Id arts. 14(2), 15(2)(b), at 9-10.
5. The Commission's Investigatory Powers
Under the Regulation, the Commission has almost unlimited inves-
tigatory powers.148 The Commission may request any "necessary in-
formation" from Member States, the involved undertakings, or,
apparently, any third party;149 the Commission may also demand ac-
cess to any business records, employees, or operations of undertak-
ings.150 The Commission is required to notify the authorities of the
Member States in which the targets of discovery reside of any discov-
ery requests and demands,151 and must include the "legal basis and
the purpose of any request" for information. 5 2 The Commission
may fine a party that fails to fully comply with the Commission's re-
quests and demands.153 Any party that has been served with a dis-
covery request or demand, or has been fined for failing to comply,
may appeal the Commission's decision to the Court of Justice. 5 4
The Regulation provides for the protection of legitimate "business
secrets" of the parties being investigated by the Commission. 155
However, the implementation of these protections is largely left to
the Commission's discretion. Where a joint notification is required,
the parties may submit competitively sensitive business secrets under
separate cover and refer to them in the Notification Form as an
"annex."156
6. The Merger Regulation's Jurisdictional Provisions
The jurisdictional provisions of the regulation are designed to par-
tially eliminate the "maze of inconsistent national controls that have
been used by some Member States to advance protectionist-like poli-
cies." 157 The Regulation supplants Articles 85 and 86158 and provides
the Commission with exclusive jurisdiction to review transactions
148. Id. arts. 13(2), 13(3), at 8-9. Presumably, these powers apply to parties located
outside of the Community. However, enforcement of these powers outside the Com-
munity may be more difficult. In these cases, the Commission may be compelled to
exercise its power to prevent foreign mergers within the Community in order to com-
pel compliance by foreign firms.
149. Id. at art. 11(1), at 8.
150. Id. art. 13(1), at 8-9.
151. Id. arts. 11(2), 13(2), at 8, 9.
152. Id. at arts. 11(3), at 8.
153. Id. arts. 14, 15, at 9-10. The Commission may impose fines of between ECU
1,000 and ECU 50,000, and/or cumulative daily fines of up to ECU 25,000, for intention-
ally or negligently supplying incorrect or misleading information or refusing to submit
to an investigation ordered by the Commission. Id arts. 14(1), 15(1), at 9.
154. Id arts. 11(5), 13(3), at 8, 9.
155. Id arts. 4(3), 20(2), at 5, 11.
156. Hawk, EEC Merger Regulation, supra note 32, at 235. See also EC Commission
Approves Implementing Merger Rules, [July-Dec.] Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA), at
144 (July 26, 1990) (discussing the submission of confidential information to the Com-
mission and the treatment of such information by the Commission).
157. Hawk, EEC Merger Regulation, supra note 32, at 224. The Regulation provides
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which meet the Regulation definitions and thresholds.159 However,
the jurisdictional issues regarding those proposed mergers falling
outside of the Regulation remain complex. Such transactions are
subject to challenge by Member States that request a review of the
transaction, or by private parties and Member States in national
courts under both Articles 85 and 86 and the national merger en-
forcement laws.
Even if a proposed transaction falls within the Regulation,*a Mem-
ber State may still intervene where the transaction "threatens to cre-
ate or to strengthen a dominant position as a result of which effective
competition would be significantly impeded in a market, within that
Member State, which presents all the characteristics of a distinct
market, be it a substantial part of the common market or not."160 In-
tervention by the Member State is also warranted where the transac-
tion threatens "legitimate interests" not previously considered by the
Commission, so long as the interests are compatible with the princi-
ples of the Treaty of Rome and its provisions.161
the exclusive standard of any review by the Commission. Council Regulation 4067/89
on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings, 1989 O.J. (L 395)1.
158. Council Regulation 4067/89 on the Control of Concentrations Between Under-
takings, 1989 0. J. (L395) 1.
159. "No Member State shall apply its national legislation on competition to any
concentration that has a Community dimension." Id, art. 21(2), at 11. The Commis-
sion's decisions, however, will be subject to review by the Court of Justice. Id, arts. 16,
21(1), at 10, 11.
160. Id arts. 9, 21, at 7, 11. This exception, known as the "German Clause," allows
a Member State, within three weeks of receiving a copy of the notification, to inform
the Commission of' a perceived threat within one of its distinct markets. Id art. 9(2),
at 7. Factors relevant to the determination of a "distinct market" include entry barri-
ers, consumers' preferences, the parties' market shares, and product substitutability.
Id art. 9(7), at 7.
If the Commission determines that there is indeed a distinct market and that a
threat exists, it may either refer the case to the Member State or examine the Member
State's concerns itself. Id art. 9(3), at 7. Otherwise, the Commission will proceed with
its investigation. Id A Member State, receiving a case referral, has four months to
make its findings. Id art 9(6), at 7. Any remedial measures taken by the Commission
or the Member State must be limited to those which are "strictly necessary to safe-
guard or restore effective competition" in the threatened market. Id. arts. 9(8), 22(5),
at 7, 11-12. The "German Clause" will be reviewed by the Council of Ministers within
four years of the Regulation's implementation. Id. art. 9(10), at 7.
161. Id art. 21(3), at 11; see EEC TREATY; SMrr & HERZOG, supra note 10. The Reg-
ulation defines "legitimate interests" as "[p]ublic security, plurality of the media and
rules of caution," as well as any other legitimate interest claimed by a Member State
which is considered by the Commission to be compatible with the "general principles
and other provisions of Community law." Council Regulation 4064/89 on the Control
of Concentrations Between Undertakings, art. 21(3), 1989 O.J. (L 395) 11. A Commis-
sion decision regarding the latter definition of legitimate interest must by made within
one month of a Member State's request. I& Presumably, the Regulation's definition.
If a transaction does not meet the Regulation's definition of "con-
centration" or its "Community dimension" threshold, it is subject to
three distinct legal challenges, depending upon which standard is not
met. The first challenge emanates from the Regulation itself, which
authorizes Member States to request the Commission to review a
proposed transaction which meets the Regulation's "concentration"
definition, but has no "Community dimension."'162 The Commission
may review such a concentration if it determines that the concentra-
tion "creates or strengthens a dominant position as a result of which
effective competition would by significantly impeded within the terri-
tory" of the concerned Member State.163 Furthermore, it may declare
the concentration incompatible with the Common Market (or condi-
tionally compatible) to the extent that the concentration affects trade
between Member States.164 This challenge is not available where the
transaction does not meet the Regulation's definition of "concentra-
tion," in which case the Commission will not review the transaction,
regardless of its size, and will render a decision to that effect.165
The other two legal challenges may be asserted when the transac-
tion fails either the "concentration" definition or the "Community di-
mension" threshold. 166 In the absence of Commission jurisdiction,
Member States which have merger enforcement laws may contest a
of "public interest" incorporates Article 223 of the Treaty of Rome, which authorizes a
Member State to take such measures as are "necessary for the protection of the essen-
tial interests of its security which are connected with the production of or trade in
arms, munitions, and war material," although the Regulation's definition is probably
broader. EEC TREATY, art. 223. Unlike the "German Clause," this exception does not
limit a Member State's remedial measures to those "strictly necessary" to protect their
"legitimate interests," and allows it to take any "appropriate measures" necessary to
protect those interests. Compare Council Regulation 4064/89 on the Control of Con-
centrations Between Undertakings, art. 21(3), at 11, and id. art. 9(2), at 7.
162. I art. 22, at 11-12. A request by a Member State must be made within one
month after receipt of a copy of the notification. Id art. 22(4), at 11. Like the "Ger-
man Clause," this provision, known as the "Dutch Clause," limits remedies to those
"strictly necessary to maintain or restore effective competition" within the concerned
Member State's territory. Id art. 22(5), at 11-12. The Commission intends to consider
Member State's requests under this provision only if the undertakings' aggregate
worldwide turnover is more than two billion ECU or the aggregate Community-wide
turnover of at least two of the undertakings is more than 100 million ECU, limiting
this provision to large transactions. Hawk, EEC Merger Regulation, supra note 32, at
227. Under the "Dutch Clause," the Commission will apply the Regulation's substan-
tive standards, and not those of Articles 85 and 86. Brittan Still Wants treaty with
U.S., Clar(ies Misconceptions with Merger Rule, [Aug.-Dec.] Antitrust & Trade Reg.
Rep. (BNA), at 517 (Oct. 4, 1990).
The "Dutch Clause" will continue in effect only until the thresholds have been re-
viewed by the Council within four years. Council Regulation No. 4064/89, on the Con-
trol of Concentrations Between Undertakings, art. 22(6), 1989 0. J. (L 395) 12.
163. Id art. 22(3), at 11.
164. Id,
165. Id. art. 6(1)(a), at 6.
166. Id
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proposed merger in their national courts. 6 7 In addition, under Arti-
cles 85 and 86, private parties may also challenge a transaction which
does not fall within the Regulation, just as they could have prior to
its enactment. 16
Recognizing that the Treaty of Rome is merely a "general frame-
work of the achievement of the fundamental objectives" of the
EEC,169 the Regulation provides some substance to this framework
by providing a uniform, Community-wide set of merger standards.
The goal of the Regulation (and other similar EEC regulations) is to
create "social and economic cohesion," 17o which is necessary for the
successful "dismantling of internal frontiers."171 However, it is im-
portant to remember that the Regulation is itself merely a complex
framework for the establishment of a Community-wide merger pol-
icy. The substance will develop as the Commission reviews proposed
mergers under this Regulation.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Critique of the EEC Merger Regulation
The EEC Merger Regulation has evoked considerable discussion
during its sixteen years of development, as well as considerable re-
sponse to its provisions at the time of implementation. Commentary
originates from both sides of the Atlantic and addresses issues rang-
ing from the propriety of exclusive Community-wide merger control
to the specific provisions of the Regulation. Most experts agree that
EEC merger enforcement is a necessary step toward realizing a truly
unified Common Market that will improve the economic condition of
Europe and enhance the competitiveness of the EEC on a global
scale.' 72 However, the Regulation does currently suffer from short-
comings that, if not remedied, could jeopardize the EEC's goal of suc-
cessful economic unification.
167. Id, at 1.
168. Prior to enactment of the Regulation, the Commission could make a challenge
in national courts under Articles 85 and 86. However, since the Regulation is intended
to be the exclusive means of Commission review, id, the Commission does not intend
to apply Articles 85 and 86 to transactions falling outside of the Regulation. Hawk,
EEC Merger Regulation, supra note 32, at 231.
169. Council Regulation 4064/89 on the Control of Concentrations Between Under-
takings, 1989 O.J. (L 395)2.
170. Id,
171. Id
172. See, e.g., Callister, supra 6, at 97.
1. The Continuing Debate Over the Merger Regulation
Despite the EC Commission's advocacy of a uniform merger con-
trol regime, the prudence of EEC legislation in this area was never
assumed. While the prevailing sentiment favored Community-wide
regulation,173 a number of officials from Member States that had ex-
tensive merger legislation already in place voiced opposition to the
Commission's efforts.174 Originally, this opposition had been success-
ful in blocking approval of the Merger Regulation by the Council of
Ministers. However, once it became apparent that, without the Regu-
lation, the Commission would review concentrations using the inade-
quate tools of Articles 85 and 86,175 the arguments against the
Regulation became overshadowed by concern that the EEC would
enter 1993 without an effective means of preventing the emergence
of market-dominating firms within the EEC.
Even after the adoption of the Regulation by the Council, many na-
tional authorities have persisted in complicating an expeditious im-
plementation of the Regulation. British authorities, not confident of
the Commission's willingness to apply purely competitive criteria,
have advocated the creation of another regulatory body, independent
of the EC Commission, to review mergers.176 In addition, these offi-
cials, doubting the ability of the Commission to competently review
mergers in an expeditious manner, have suggested that the Commis-
sion solicit help from national authorities.177
With the Regulation now in force, the current discussion focuses in
part on specific terms within the Regulation. The threshold levels
that presently determine the scope of the Regulation are the result of
173. Comments of the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law with Re-
spect to the Amended Proposal for a Council Regulation (EEC) on the Control of Con-
centrations Between Undertakings, 59 ANTITRUST L.J. 245, 254 (1990).
174. "Over-stretched 'exclusivity' models in favor of community law as are pres-
ently envisaged by many, including the EC Commission, can under present conditions,
only create an unreasonable risk of reducing effective merger control in Europe rather
than reinforcing it." Markert, supra note 2, at 926. "A one-stop shop for merger con-
trol at the European Community level 'was not achievable .... '" UK Enforcement
Official Sketches Chances for Success in EC Merger Control, [Jan.-July] Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA), at 323 (Mar. 1, 1990)(quoting Sir Gordon Borrie, Director Gen-
eral of the UK's Office of Fair Trading).
175. See supra notes 80-86 and accompanying text.
176. See UK Group Studies EC Commission, Pushes for Independent Cartel Agency,
[Aug.-Dec.] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA), at 469 (Sept. 27, 1990). The United
Kingdom intends to present a proposal of the creation of an independent European
Cartel Office when the Regulation is reviewed four years after its adoption. Id.
177. UK Agency Offers EC Commission Helping Hand in Reviewing Mergers, [Jan.-
July] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA), at 228 (Feb. 8, 1990). Interested national
authorities will undoubtedly invoke Article 19 of the Regulation, which requires the
Commission to work in "constant and close" liaison with antitrust officials of the
Member States. Council Regulation 4064/89 on the Control of Concentrations Be-
tween Undertakings, art. 19(2), 1989 O.J. (L 395)10. See also Callister, supra note 6, at
20.
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compromise. Therefore, most commentators espouse the view that
the thresholds should be set at a different level, with some advocat-
ing a higher figure and others pressing for a lower figure.178 In fact,
the American Bar Association has suggested that the threshold level
be based on the size of the transaction, as is the threshold level under
the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act,179 rather than the size of the parties.180
2. The Merger Regulation's Threshold Levels
At the currently high levels of the Regulation's thresholds, there
are many small mergers and small parties that will not achieve these
levels and therefore will not be covered by the Regulation. Although
this will result in smaller mergers that may have anticompetitive ef-
fects in spite of their size, it will also mean that those parties who
would benefit most from the convenience and low cost of exclusive
Community-wide merger control will remain exposed to the burden-
some panoply of national merger enforcement.
Of course, the national authorities who have opposed the relin-
quishment of merger control to the EEC have opposed the threshold
levels on the ground that they are too low, given the limited re-
sources and personnel of the Commission.'18 Formation of a fifty-
one member Commission staff to review mergers was based upon an
178. 'The dispute between the Commission and the Member States about the size
of the thresholds concerns the allocation of merger control power between the Com-
munity and the Member States." Comments of the American Bar Association Section
of Antitrust Law with Respect to the Amended Proposal for a Council Regulation
(EEC) on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings, 59 ANTrrRusT L.J. 245,
253 (1990).
179. 1d, at 247; 16 C.F.R. § 802.20 (1990).
180. Comments of the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law with Re-
spect to the Amended Proposal for a Council Regulation (EEC) on the Control of Con-
centrations Between Undertakings, 59 ANTITRUST L.J. 245, 252-53 (1990). In addition,
the threshold's emphasis on turnover favors control of mergers involving high turno-
ver, low margin firms and limits control of low turnover, high margin firms. I& at 252.
181. "I [have] favored much higher thresholds, to avoid the Commission taking on
too many cases too quickly while building up their resources." UK Agency Offers EC
Commission Helping Hand in Reviewing Mergers, [Jan.-July] Antitrust & Trade Reg.
Rep. (BNA), at 229 (Feb. 8, 1990) (quoting Sydney Lipworth, Chairman of the UK Mo-
nopolies and Mergers Commission). At current threshold levels, the Commission has
estimated that only about 40 to 50 transactions, not including those proposed by non-
EEC parties, will be subject to the Regulation. EC Council of Ministers Adopts Regu-
lation to Control Acquisitions, [Jan.-July] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA), at 22
(Jan. 4, 1990). Not only has the quantity of staffing been called into question, the ex-
perience of the Commission's staff members in reviewing mergers does not match that
of national authorities in Member States where premerger notification has been in
place for years. IUK Agency Offers EC Commission a Helping Hand in Reviewing
Mergers, [Jan.-July] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA), at 228 (Feb. 8, 1990).
estimate of thirty notifications per year at the current threshold
levels.18 2 However, this number of staff members may indeed by in-
sufficient to handle both EEC and non-EEC transactions, which are
predicted to total up to 200 per year.18 3 Further, the Commission
staff, in light of the short deadlines imposed by the Regulation and
the amount of information that will be provided in the Notification
Forms, may not be able to review transactions in a thorough and fair
manner.1 4
3. The Merger Regulation's Unresolved Ambiguities
Although the Regulation's provisions are quite specific both proce-
durally and substantively, they nevertheless contain many ambigui-
ties that undoubtedly will create uncertainty in the Commission's
review of mergers and acquisitions. 8 5 For instance, Article 3(3)
adopts a de facto standard of control for determining whether a
transaction triggers the Regulation.1 8 A transaction that "confer[s]
the possibility of decisive influence on an undertaking" meets the
control standard under this provision.1 8 7 Since "decisive influence"
calls for a subjective evaluation judgment, the Commission's determi-
nation of control will not be a ministerial fiction. Therefore, it will
require a convincing analysis in many cases, especially those involv-
ing joint ventures and acquisitions of minority shareholdings.1 8 8 Con-
182. EC Commission Approves Implementing Merger Rules, [July-Dec.] Daily Rep.
for Executives (BNA), at 144 (July 26, 1990). The Commission's estimate of annual no-
tifications was later revised to 60 notifications per year. Mergers Continue Upward
Trend, EC Commission Notes in Annual Report, [Jan.-June] Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA), at 1007 (June 28, 1991).
183. See Commission Approves Notification Rules for New Merger Regulation F-f-
fective Sept 21, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) at 1196 (Aug. 1, 1990).
184. See UK Agency Offers EC Commission Helping Hand in Reviewing Mergers,
[Jan.-July] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA), at 228 (Feb. 8, 1990).
185. "The Regulation's assessment criteria to examine mergers are highly ambigu-
ous in a number of respects. Consistent predictable application of the criteria cannot
be expected unless a number of rather fundamental issues are addressed." Harry M.
Reasoner, Comments of the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law with
Respect to the Amended Proposal for a Council Regulation (EEC) on the Control of
Concentrations Between Undertakings, 59 ANTITRUST L.J. 245, 247 (1990).
186. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text. Compare 16 C.F.R. § 801.1
(1991) (defining control as at least 50% ownership under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act).
187. Council Regulation 4064/89 on the Control of Concentrations Between Under-
takings, art. 3(3), 1989 O.J. (L 395) 4.
188. Article 3 appears to distinguish between "concentrative" and "cooperative"
joint ventures in its exclusion from coverage of "operation[s] .. .which have as [their]
object or effect the coordination of the competitive behavior of [independent] under-
takings." Id. art. 3 at 4. Under this clause "concentrative" joint ventures would seem
to be within the Regulation, while "cooperative" joint ventures would be excluded.
The Commission has attempted to clarify the distinction. See Commission Notice Re-
garding the Concentrative and Cooperative Operations Under Council Regulation
(EEC) 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the Control of Concentrations Between Under-
takings, 1990 O.J. (C 196)10. However, the Commission has yet to provide which joint
ventures are included within the Regulation's purview, and this remains a subject of
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sequently, companies may find it difficult to know whether they are
subject to notification.189
Article 9, which allows the Commission to refer notified mergers to
authorities of a Member State where the merger threatens to impede
competition in a "distinct market" within that Member State,190 is
also highly ambiguous, given the absence of any guidelines within the
Regulation for determining the definition of "market." Although
this exception is intended to apply in limited circumstances, the
Commission may be able to circumvent its simplistic language by ex-
panding its scope unduly if the number of notifications exceeds the
Commission's resources.191
4. The Merger Regulation's Burdensome Notification Form
Presently, the most common criticism of the Regulation comes
from the many business persons and attorneys, faced with the task of
completing the Notification Form.19 2 Many of these persons perceive
the Form to be unduly burdensome, especially in light of the one
week filing deadline.193 Although the Commission stated that the
Form balances "the Commission's need for full information at the be-
ginning of a case and the requirement that the burden placed on in-
dustry should be as light as possible,"194 the amount and nature of
information required by the From presently fulfills neither of these
confusion. See Mergers Continue Upward Trend, EC Commission Notes in Annual Re-
port, [Jan.-June] Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA), at 1008 (June 28, 1991).
189. "Parties should not be required to expend money to discover whether to notify
the Commission concerning a proposed transaction .... ." Fordham Conference Ex-
plores Regulation of International Mergers, Joint Ventures, [Aug.-Dec.] Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1490, at 689 (Nov. 8, 1990).
190. Council Regulation 4064/89 on the Control of Concentrations Between Under-
takings, art. 9, 1989 O.J. (L 395) 7.
191. See MMC Official Favors Creation of Separate EEC Mergers Agency, [Jan.-
July] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA), at 978 (June 21, 1990) (European Commis-
sion claims it will use Article 9 sparingly, but difficulties prompting a change may
occur).
192. For a discussion of the contents of the Notification Form, see supra notes 125-
37 and accompanying text. "[T]he draft of the notification form released for comment
'received enormous critical acclaim,' but 'unfortunately, it was all critical.' The Form
was revised to ease the burden on industry, but critics still argued that the form would
saddle merging parties with too much paperwork .. " ABA Section Probes Develop-
ments in EC Competition Law and Policy, [Jan.-June] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep.
(BNA) No. 60, at 898 (June 27, 1991) (quoting Christopher Jones of the Commission's
Merger Task Force).
193. Most of the critics of the Notification Form are American practitioners who
are accustomed to the more cursory initial filing required for premerger notification
under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act. See 16 C.F.R. app. § 803 (1991).
194. EC Commission Approves Notification Rules for New Merger Regulation Ff-
interests. In addition to being costly and time-consuming for the par-
ties to compile, 19 5 even with only substantial compliance,196 the infor-
mation received by the Commission will consume a large percentage
of the Commission staff's time. Much of this time will be spent sift-
ing through superfluous information, rather than analyzing the rele-
vant information.
The Regulation provides for the confidentiality of parties' "busi-
ness secrets" which may be required to complete the Notification
Form.197 These general provisions allow the Commission to deter-
mine the extent of confidentiality by defining what constitutes a
"business secret." How the Commission frames this definition will
become very important in cases of joint notification. In these cases, a
limited scope of confidentiality may result in the exchange of such
sensitive information between parties, which would constitute a vio-
lation of the Sherman Act under United States antitrust law.198 This
inherent conflict between joint notification and the Sherman Act
could create a possibly insurmountable dilemma for United States
firms that will be subject to the Regulation.
It took sixteen years for the Commission to convince the Member
States that Community-wide merger control is feasible and desirable.
Many of the Regulation's shortcomings represent areas where ten-
sions between the Commission and the Member States still exist. In
order to prevent these tensions from jeopardizing the operational
success of the Regulation, these criticisms must be addressed in the
near future. The Commission's ability to deal with these issues will
reflect upon its political will, in terms of convincing the Member
states to subjugate their national sovereignty to the interests of the
EEC.
B. Addressing the Regulation's laws
The Commission must deal with these fundamental problems ex-
isting within the Regulation because their underlying tensions are
not likely to simply disappear. Undoubtedly, the Commission will
entertain many suggestions for improving the Regulation, some ema-
fective Sept 21, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 7, at 1196 (Aug. 1, 1990) (quoting Commis-
sion press release).
195. See infra note 229 and accompanying text. For many smaller mergers subject
to the Regulation, the cost of completing the Form may tilt the cost/benefit analysis
against the transaction.
196. See supra note 126.
197. Council Regulation 4064/89 on the Control of Concentrations Between Under-
takings, arts. 4(3), 20(2), 1989 O.J. (L 395) 5, 11. See also supra note 154 and accompa-
nying text.
198. See American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921)(ex-
change of price information); Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers Assoc., 234 U.S.
600 (1914) (exchange of non-price information).
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nating from self-interest and others reflecting a sincere desire to see
merger control[ contribute to the success of the EEC. The following
suggestions, free from self-interest, are respectfully submitted as im-
provements which will augment the effectiveness of the Regulation,
from the perspectives of both business and government.
1. Tightening the Merger Regulation's Ambiguities
The Regulation's unresolved ambiguities give the Commission wide
latitude in determining the direction of EC merger control. While
they may expose the Commission to external pressures,1 99 the Com-
mission should. remember that, just as a corporation's directors have
a duty to the corporation and all of the shareholders, it has a duty to
the EEC and all of the Member States. For instance, the loose defini-
tion of "control" provided by Article 3(3) will give rise to arguments
in favor of limiting the Regulation's scope by defining "decisive influ-
ence" as "unilateral influence," the highest possible standard of con-
trol that could exist.200 However, a preferable definition of a
preponderance of influence already exists in Article 5(4),201 and the
Commission should adopt this provision as the definition of "decisive
influence." This action would provide a sufficiently broad standard
of control, using language that the Member States have already
adopted, and would avoid the risk of having to formulate a sui
generis definition which the Member States may or may not accept.
The "German clause,"202 and to a lesser extent' the "legitimate in-
terests" excepltion,203 constitute another source of pressure on the
Commission to limit the scope of the Regulation's exclusive jurisdic-
tion. These provisions are contrary to the Regulation's purpose of
providing companies with an alternative to the web of Member State
199. Callister, ,,pra note 6, at 116. "[The politics of the various Member States
may influence Commission decisions." Id
200. See Council Regulation 4064/89 on the Control of Concentrations Between Un-
dertakings, art. 3(3), 1989 O.J. (L 395) 4.
201. Iti art. 5(4), at 5. Article 5(4), which deals with the calculation of turnover,
requires parties to include the turnover of their subsidiaries, if:
the undertaking concerned, directly or indirectly;-owns more than half the
capital or business assets, or -has the power to exercise more than half the
voting rights, or -has the power to appoint more than half the members of
the supervisory board, the administrative board or bodies legally representing
the undertakings, or -has the right to manage the undertakings' affairs ....
Id, at art. 5(4)(b), at 5.
202. Id art. 9, at 7.
203. Id, art. 21(3), at 11.
merger enforcement. 20 4 Thus, any expansion of these exceptions
may create doubt and uncertainty as to the significance of the Regu-
lation. While these exceptions were necessary to gain Member State
acceptance, the Commission must maintain its resolve to apply these
provisions in only the most extreme situations.
2. Setting the Merger Regulation's Threshold Levels
Many scholars expect that the Commission will overcome a
number of the problems with the current threshold levels when it re-
views, and most likely lowers, these levels in 1993.205 Lower thresh-
old levels will broaden the scope of the Regulation, subjecting
smaller mergers to the notification requirement, while offering the
expected convenience of uniform EEC merger enforcement to the
parties behind those mergers. Before the Commission can expect to
obtain the approval of Member States for these lower thresholds,
however, the Commission staff must earn the confidence of the
Member States which it now lacks.206 Ideally, when the Commission
reviews the thresholds in 1993, the staff will have become an exper-
ienced, competent merger enforcement authority. However, if the
staff appears overwhelmed by the number of notifications or is un-
able to establish a consistent policy, then the threshold levels are
likely to increase rather than decrease, in order to reduce the
number of mergers that the Regulation covers, and therefore reduce
the number of mergers requiring review by the Commission's staff.
If the Commission lowers the threshold levels, it will need to in-
crease the staff size, drawing from a pool of experts representing the
various EEC countries, as it did for the present staff.207 The Com-
mission will need to ensure that these new staff members exchange
their national identities for an EEC identity, as it will not be able to
withstand nationalistic pressures if these pressures exist
internally.208
3. The Merger Regulation's Deadlines and Notification Form
Although the Regulation authorizes the Commission to extend the
204. See supra notes 194-98 and accompanying text.
205. Hawk, EEC Merger Regulation, supra note 32, at 209 n.37.
206. If the Commission lowers merger thresholds, some have predicted that the
Commission could receive as many as 300 notifications per year. EC Practitioners Ad-
vise Colleagues on Pitfalls of Merger Regulation, [Jan.-June] Antitrust & Trade Reg.
Rep. (BNA) No. 1515, at 673 (May 9, 1991).
207. Half of the Commission's merger control division staff come from national
merger authorities. EC Commission Approves Implementing Merger Rules, [July-Dec.]
Daily Rep, for Executives (BNA), at 144 (July 26, 1990).
208. The fact that the Commission is dependent upon the Member States for its
personnel requirements puts a premium on cooperation with the Member States with-
out succumbing to their nationalistic pressures.
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deadlines set forth in the Regulation's provisions in, certain in-
stances, 209 the Commission staff must resist the temptation to do so
whenever possible. Consistent failure to meet deadlines will verify
the Member States' concerns and make them less willing to confer
exclusive merger control powers upon the Commission.
Similarly, the amount of information required by the Notification
Form must be reduced.2 10 Currently, the Notification Form is un-
duly demanding of the parties and the Commission's resources. As
the Commission becomes more accustomed to the kinds of informa-
tion that are relevant to its review, it should streamline the Form by
eliminating those portions that request information which the Com-
mission staff does not usually consider in its initial review of notifica-
tions. If the staff finds that such information is necessary in certain
cases, it may request the information pursuant to its investigatory
powers.
4. Gaining Confidence in the Commission Staff
In addition to gaining the confidence of the Member States, the
staff will need to gain the confidence of the parties involved in a noti-
fied merger, regarding the confidentiality of business secrets that the
parties divulge to the Commission pursuant to the Notification
Form.21 ' Given the broad investigatory powers of the Commission,
fairness dictates that the Commission be receptive to the confidenti-
ality concerns of the parties.2 1 2 By upholding the confidentiality
clause in the Begulation, the Commission will encourage firms to be
cooperative in its investigations.
209. Council Regulation 4064/89 on the Control of Concentrations Between Under-
takings, art. 10(4), 1989 O.J. (L 393) 8.
210. The Commission will review the notification Form after 12 months of the Reg-
ulation's operation. EC Commission Revises Notifcation Form to Ease Burdens of
Merger Regulation, [Aug.-Dec.] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1477, at 187
(Aug. 2, 1990).
211. See supra notes 155-56 and accompanying text. In fact, the Commission should
consider adopting the approach taken by the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act to gain more confi-
dence of the divulging parties. Under this Act, rather than confidentiality being an ex-
ception, all information submitted by the parties is confidential, unless it is relevant to
a judicial or administrative proceeding. Clayton Act, § 7A(h), 15 U.S.C. § 18a(h) (1988).
212. Because of the number of people at the Commission who will have access to
confidential business records, some persons have suggested that the Commission dele-
gate confidentiality decisions to the Commissioner for Competition. Hawk, EEC
Merger Regulation, supra note 32, at 221 n.84. However, this solution assures that the
Commission staff will be unable to make independent decisions concerning confidenti-
ality. There is no reason why staff mergers will not be able to adequately address the
parties' confidentiality concerns.
Eventually, two factors will determine the evolution of the Regula-
tion and its role in the EEC. First, remembering that the regulation
is a child of negotiation, the pressure for changes in the Regulation
will probably come from those EEC countries that choose to exert
economic and political influence upon the Commission. The Commis-
sion's ability to withstand this pressure and independently forge a
consistent competition policy regarding mergers and acquisitions will
determine the direction and success of EEC merger control. Second,
the operational successes and failures of the Regulation will give the
Commission a degree of hindsight which will allow it to refine the
provisions of the Regulation.213 Hopefully, the Commission and its
staff will be able to utilize the experience that it gains in a manner
beneficial to the cohesion of the Common Market.
IV. IMPACT
A. European Competition Law Under the EEC Merger Regulation:
An Emphasis on Competition
As with any other new body of law, pre-merger notification under
the Regulation will assume characteristics of its own, which will play
a major role in cutting the competitive path taken by the Common
Market. The Regulation is unique among recent legal developments
because this formation will occur within, and impact, a similarly ex-
perimental structure - the post-1992 European economic market.
The proposed draft Regulation would have allowed the Commis-
sion to authorize a potentially anticompetitive merger which never-
theless improves "production and distribution" or promotes
"technical or economic progress." 2 14 This exemption evoked consid-
erable discussion concerning the possible emergence of "European
champions" 2 15 under EEC merger enforcement. The Commission
eliminated this authorization because of the concern over internal
competition in European markets which these companies dominate,
and the possibility of having to protect these "champions" when they
begin to fail216 to the detriment of external competition in these mar-
213. See infra notes 215-18 and accompanying text (discussing the Commission's at-
tempt to avoid European mega-firms).
214. See supra note 88 and accompanying text (concerning the anticompetitive
merger change in the draft merger regulation).
215. "European champions" are European-based mega-firms that, although inter-
nally anticompetitive, would influence, and sometimes dominate, markets
internationally.
216. "Most champions of the kind that engaged in tournaments in the Middle Ages
fell off their horses because their armor was so heavy that they couldn't effectively
fight in it. I suppose the analogy is well taken." Mergers Continue Upward Trend EC
Commission Notes in Annual Report, [Jan.-June] Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 25, at
1005 (June 28, 1991) (quoting EC Competition Commissioner Leon Brittan).
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kets.2 17 The elimination of this exemption indicates that the future
of EEC competition under the Regulation will focus on internally
competitive European markets, rather than predation of markets by
European mega-firms on an international level.
B. A Practical Guide for American Lawyers
Because the Regulation is still in its infancy, American lawyers, es-
pecially those not extremely well-versed in the idiosyncrasies of the
European legal system, should rely on the actual terms of the Treaty
of Rome and the Merger Regulation. In addition, these lawyers
should carefully examine the language of the relevant Court of Jus-
tice opinions.2 -8 Until American lawyers gain experience with the
administration of the Regulation by the Commission, these opinions
constitute the only solid sources for predicting the actions of the
Commission.2 1 9 Presently, however, those faced with encountering
the new European regulatory scheme should consider the following
observations.
1. Double Enforcement Under the Merger Regulation and the
Hart-Scott-Rodino Act
First, it is important to remember that European merger law,
whether national or procedural, differs substantially from United
States merger legislation. In the United States, the Hart-Scott-
Rondino Act ("HSR") requires that mergers valued in excess of $15
million must be notified to the FTC and the Antitrust Division of the
Justice Department. 22o Whereas the HSR notification threshold is
based upon the size of the transaction, the Merger Regulation thresh-
olds focus upon the size of the parties themselves.
As a result, mergers involving multinational companies will re-
quire a two-step analysis when determining whether, and to whom,
217. See UK Enforcement Official Sketches Chances for Success in EC Merger Con-
trol, [Jan.-July] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA), at 323 (March 1, 1990).
218. See supra notes 26, 31, 33, 80, and accompanying text.
219. With all of its imperfections, United States merger law has evolved to the
point where lawyers may rely on precedent in analyzing a client's merger proposal.
Such precedent does not yet exist under the Merger Regulation, and "for the foresee-
able future at least, specialists will frequently be unable to advise their clients with
any confidence as to whether their transactions will be found lawful." Ronald W. Da-
vis, Corporate M&A Strategy and The New EEC Merger Control Program, 5 ANTITRUsT
L.J. 13, 16 (1990).
220. Clayton Act, § 7A, 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1988); 16 C.F.R. § 802.20 (1990). Section 7 of
the Clayton Act provides the substantive standard for determining the legality of a
merger.
notification is required. The size of the merger will be relevant to
HSR notification requirements, while the size of the parties, in terms
of business within the EEC, will be relevant to Merger Regulation re-
quirements. 221 Because the regulations emphasize different aspects
of a transaction, notification under one regulation does not have any
bearing upon whether notification is required under the other. Thus,
for example, a small merger that does not require notification under
HSR may require notification under the Merger Regulation if the
parties do a large amount of business within the Community, regard-
less of the effect of the transaction itself on the Common Market.
Likewise, a large merger, with respect to the size of the involved par-
ties, that requires notification under HSR may not require notifica-
tion under the Merger Regulation if those parties are small, even if
the merger substantially affects the parties's European operations.
In terms of extraterritorial coverage, the Merger Regulation is
broader then HSR.222 While HSR is less inclusive when mergers in-
volve "foreign persons" and assets located outside the United
States,223 the Merger Regulation thresholds apply equally, regardless
of where the parties or their assets are located, and the ECU turno-
ver threshold may be met by sales of products imported into the
EEC.224 As a result, transactions involving parties who have never
even seen European shores but who each ship ECU 250 million, or
together ship ECU 5 billion in goods to Europe will fall within the
Merger Regulation.225 Thus, any merger proposal must take into
consideration the possibility that the involved parties may do enough
aggregate business with or within the EEC to require notification
under the Regulation, even if the merger has no effect upon parties'
European operations.226
221. Council Regulation 4064/89 on the Control of Concentration Between Under-
takings, art. 1(2), 1989 O.J. (L 395) 3.
222. Arguably, the legal basis for the Regulation's extraterritoriality originates in
Case 89/85, A. AhIstrom Osakeyhtio v. Commission, 1988 E.C.R., [1987-88 Transfer
Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,491 (Sept. 27, 1988), where the Court of Justice
held that Article 85 applies to agreements between or among non-EEC firms which are
implemented within the EEC. Merger Regulation coverage will probably become even
broader in 1993, when the Council of Ministers reviews the threshold levels. Council
Regulation 4064/89 on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings, art. 1(3),
1989 O.J. (L 395) 3. At that time, they are expected to be lowered. EC Practitioners
Advise Colleagues on Pi(falls of Merger Control Regulation, [Jan-June] Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1515, at 673 (May 9, 1991).
223. HSR provides an exemption, in certain instances, for acquisitions by foreign
persons. See 16 C.F.R. § 802.51 (1990).
224. Council Regulation 4064/89 on the Control of Concentrations Between Under-
takings, art. 5(1), 1989 O.J. (L 395) 5.
225. Id. art. 1 (2)(a) & (b). Implicit in the Regulation is the realization that any
company that sells even a fraction of this amount within the EEC will probably main-
tain local headquarters and production facilities within the EEC.
226. "The net of the European Community's merger control regulation is wide
enough to snare a merger between two non-EC enterprises if they both have opera-
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2. The Advantages and Disadvantages of Merger Regulation
Coverage
For some mergers, Merger Regulation coverage may be attractive,
while for others, it may not. If a merger affects markets within a
number of Member States, the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regula-
tion, if applicable, can present a desirable alternative to duplicative
review under the Member States' national legislation. Further,
although the Regulation was created to resolve the shortcomings of
Articles 85 and 86, the substantive standard of review under the Reg-
ulation remain,; essentially the same.
However, the Regulation's Notification Form is quite extensive227
and may be burdensome in light of the one week filing deadline.
This is especially true where information concerning the parties is in-
accessible until after a merger agreement is finalized.228 Because of
this onerous deadline, parties negotiating a merger subject to the
Regulation should start compiling information for use in the Form as
early as possible, much earlier than in a United States transaction.229
In addition, parties should informally notify the Commission before
formal notification to get a feel for the Commission's predisposi-
tions in the EC .... "ECPractitioners Advise Colleagues on Pitfalls of Merger Control
Regulation, [Jan.-June] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1515, at 673 (May 9,
1991). See also Callister, supra note 6, at 121 ("The new Regulation has antitrust im-
plications reaching far beyond Europe's boundaries."). For an analysis of the first pro-
posed merger between two non-EC companies to be reviewed by the Commission
under the Regulation, see infra notes 262, 268 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text. The information required by
the Notification Form is comparable to the information that would be requested by a
"second request" under HSR. See Clayton Act, § 7A(e)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 18a(e)(1).
228. It is estimaed that the legal expenses incurred in the preparation of the Noti-
fication Form will run into the hundreds of thousands of dollars. See The EEC Merger
Regulation: Comments of the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law with
Respect to the Draft Form Notification of a Concentration, 59 ANTITRUST L.J. 263
(1990). The Form requires more extensive information than does the comparable HSR
form, and compliance with the "Information on Affected Markets" section of the
Form, in particular, is expected to be difficult. Davis, supra note 220, at 18 n.16 (1990).
Familiarity with the inquiries made by the FTC and Justice Department during HSR
investigations, which focus on elasticity of supply and demand in the affected markets,
allows parties to avoid compiling useless information. Ideally, familiarity with the
Commission's use of information will make notification under the Regulation similarly
efficient over time. For now, however, "[s]ophisticated merger law counselors will
have to guess which way that exercise will turn out." Edward F. Glynn, Jr., The EEC
Merger Regulation: An American Enforcer Looks at the EEC Merger Proposal, 59 AN-
TITRUST L.J. 237, 239 (1990).
229. The short deadline may in fact assist smaller companies competing with large
firms in an acquisition subject to the Regulation, since it may, in some instances, be
impossible for the latter to notify the deal on time.
tion.230 If the Commission manifests a strong negative reaction to-
wards the merger, the parties can revise the proposal to address the
Commission's concerns or abandon the transaction altogether, thus
avoiding the expense of preparing a futile Notification Form.
3. Dealing with a Commission Investigation
If the Commission decides to investigate a merger, it is important
to realize the broad powers that the Commission has in conducting
its investigation. 231 Not only can the Commission request informa-
tion and business records from both the involved companies and
third parties,232 it can also "enter any premises, lands and means of
transport" on a moment's notice and "ask for oral explanations on
the spot."23 3 In case of such a "raid," employees must know how to
respond to questions so as not to damage the chances for clearance.
Thus, it is crucial that employees on all levels be fully apprised of the
"party line" adopted by the strategists behind the proposed
transaction.
4. The Merger Regulation Versus the Justice Department
Merger Guidelines
In reviewing the legality of a merger under the Regulation's sub-
stantive standards, the Commission utilizes many of the same compe-
tition-based factors used by the United States Justice Department
under its Merger Guidelines. These factors include barriers to entry,
upstream and downstream effects, and supply and demand trends
within affected markets.23 4 Unlike the Merger Guidelines, however,
the Regulation does not address the market power, in terms of mar-
ket share, of other firms within the affected markets.
Even though "dominant position" has been interpreted in the con-
text of Article 86 to take into account the market shares of other
companies,23 5 this interpretation analyzes competing market shares
230. See EC Practitioners Advise Colleagues on Pitfalls of Merger Control Regula-
tion, [Jan.-June] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1515, at 673 (May 9, 1991).
Such informal contact with the Commission will also allow the Commission "to act
within the periods provided by the regulation." Id.
231. See supra notes 145-53 and accompanying text.
232. Council Regulation 4064/89 on the Control of Concentrations Between Under-
takings, arts. 11, 13, 1989 O.J. (L 395) 8-9.
233. Id. art. 13(1), at 8-9.
234. Compare id. art. 2(1), at 3, with Department of Justice Merger Guidelines and
Statement Accompanying Release 24-5, 27-8 (June 14, 1984), reprinted in 16 J.O. VON
KALINOWSKI app. C-1 (1988), and Department of Justice Vertical Restraints Guidelines
§ 3 (Jan. 23, 1985), reprinted in 16 J.O. VON KALINOWSKI app. C-1 (1988).
235. See case 85/76, Hoffman-La Roche & Co. AG v. Commission, 1979 E.C.R. 461, 3
C.M.L.R. 211 (1980). In Hoffman-La Roche, the court stated that "the relationship be-
tween the market shares of the undertaking concerned and of its competitors, espe-
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in a way opposite to that of the Justice Department's analysis.236
While a large firm competing in a market with a number of small
firms would probably pass Justice Department muster, it would raise
serious "dominance" concerns under European antitrust law. On the
other hand, while a "dominant position" would probably not be found
in a European market composed of a few large firms (an oligopoly),
such a market structure in the United States would probably raise
the ire of the Justice Department.
5. The Opportunities for Third Parties
Third parties who stand to be adversely affected by a merger may
avail themselves of certain strategic possibilities under the European
regulatory regime.237 If a merger falls within the Regulation, all par-
ties concerned are essentially at the mercy of the Commission's de-
termination.2 38 However, those who object to a merger that escapes
the notification requirement have opportunities that do not exist in
the United States.239 Private actions challenging such mergers in a
national court under Article 85 are available, just as they were prior
to the Regulation's enactment. 240 In addition, parties may lobby a
cially those of the next largest," is a relevant factor in determining whether a
"dominant position" exists under Article 86. Id.
236. The Justice Department utilizes the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index ("HHI") in
determining whether a post-merger firm has attained an unacceptable level of market
power. Department of Justice Merger Guidelines and Statement Accompanying Re-
lease 24-5, 27-8 (June 14, 1984), reprinted in 16 J.0. VON KALINOWSKI app. C-1 (1988).
"The HHI is calculated by summing the squares of the individual market shares of all
the firms included in the market ... ." Id. Generally, the Justice Department will
investigate mergers that result in an HHI of 1800 or higher and will not investigate
mergers that result. in an HHI of 1,000 or lower. Id. Those mergers that create an HHI
of between 1,000 and 1,800 will be investigated if the merger has raised the HHI by 100
points or more. Id.
237. The Regulation gives management groups and workers' representatives within
the involved parties the opportunity to be heard. This right consists of the right to
intervene, and presumably the right to appeal an objectionable Commission decision to
the Court of Justice. Council Regulation 4064/89 on the Control of Concentrations Be-
tween Undertakings, art. 18, 1989 O.J. (L 395) 10.
238. However, parties in opposition to a merger should utilize their "opportunity to
be heard" by providing the Commission with market information that they perceive to
be relevant and making economic arguments based upon this information. Id.
239. These "victims" will usually be targets of hostile takeovers, defeated compet-
ing bidders, or third party competitors. In the United States, third parties do not have
standing to challenge a merger or acquisition in court unless they can show "antitrust
injury," a difficult test to meet. See generally Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petro-
leum, Co., 495 U.S. 1097 (1990). However, there is no such requirement in European
antitrust law.
240. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
Member State that has a market affected by the merger to request
Commission intervention under the "Dutch Clause."241
6. Strategic Considerations
Firms that encounter the EC Commission and the premerger noti-
fication process must also consider the possibility that they may be-
come involved in future transactions that require notification.
Because the notification procedure is a human process, the Commis-
sion staff members are likely to remember those persons who pres-
ent problems in complying with the Regulation's requirements.
Thus, corporate counsel should place a premium on creating and
maintaining a cordial relationship with the Commission. This means
notifying when in doubt on an issue, providing accurate information,
cooperating with Commission investigatory requests, and meeting the
Regulation's deadlines whenever possible.242 The conduct of the in-
volved parties is not only likely to reflect upon the Commission's ex-
pectations of the parties' post-merger conduct, but it may also
influence the Commission's potentially conclusory and empirical de-
terminations in future notified transactions involving the same par-
ties. Although the Regulation emphasizes competition-based factors,
counselors and their clients should not lose sight of its political
genesis. 243
7. Contrasting American and European Merger Enforcement
The new EEC premerger notification procedure resembles the
United States procedure under the Clayton and HSR Acts in many
ways. However, they are not analogous. The jurisdictional quirks of
the European system should deter a prudent American attorney from
trying to superimpose the United States federal system upon the
EEC.244 While companies need only concern themselves with state
and federal law in the United States, they must contend with three
sets of merger law in the EEC: national legislation of the Member
States, Articles 85 and 86, and the Merger Regulation. 245 The Euro-
241. For the right of interested third parties to be heard, see Council Regulation
4064/89 on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings, art. 18, 1989 O.J. (L
395) 10.
242. See EC Practitioners Advise Colleagues on Pitfalls of Merger Control Regula-
tion, [Jan.-June] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1515, at 673-74 (May 9, 1991).
243. The possibility of future notifications also entails strategic considerations. For
example, a geographic and/or product market characterization by the parties in one
notification may not be the characterization that they would desire in future notifica-
tions. Since the Commission is likely to take note of inconsistencies in the parties'
prior notifications, parties should contemplate the information that they will want to
provide in future notifications in order to avoid prejudicing those transactions.
244. See infra notes 276-86 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 157-66 and accompanying text. Despite the acceptance of the
Merger Regulation's exclusive jurisdiction in principle, some of the Member States' of-
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pean situation is further complicated by the absence of an equivalent
to the United States Constitution's Commerce Clause,2 46 which allo-
cates authority between state and federal antitrust law.247
The general approaches of the Merger Regulation and HSR also
differ. For instance, all transactions notified under the Regulation
must include information that would be required only by a "second
request" under HSR.248 In addition, all transactions which the EC
Commission decides to formally investigate must undergo a process
similar to an FTC adjudication.249 However, the Commission's inves-
tigation must be concluded within four months,250 whereas an FTC
adjudication could take years. The simplified but extensive and de-
manding premerger notification procedure under the Regulation re-
flects the intent of the Commission to make European merger
vetting a more accelerated and commonplace process than that which
exists in the United States. With this in mind, American lawyers
with corporate clients who do business in the EEC and plan to trans-
act a merger that affects the Common market will need learn, prior
to closing any deals, the provisions of the new Merger Regulation and
the role that it will play within the EEC.
C. Initial Results of the Regulation in Operation
Since the Merger Regulation took effect on September 21, 1990, the
EC Commission has been notified of a number of proposed mergers
that fall within the purview of the Regulation's provisions.25 1
Although the Regulation is still in its infancy, the Commission's deci-
ficials have advocated a two-tiered system for merger review. See UK, German Pos-
tures on EC Merger Can Lead to Two-Tiered Review of Mergers, [Jan.-July] Antitrust
& Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 56, at 937 (June 29, 1989).
246. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3.
247. For a discussion of the jurisdictional problems from this absence, see in~fra
notes 262-73 and accompanying text.
248. See supra note 228.
249. Council Regulation 4064/89 on the Control of Concentrations Between Under-
takings, art. 6(1)(c), 1989 O.J. (L 395) 6.
250. Id. art. 10(3), at 8.
251. Of the 40 mergers that were notified to the Commission in the first nine
months of the Regulation's operation, 28 decisions were issued, two of which held that
the notified mergers were not covered by the Regulation, and 22 of which were cleared
by the Commission. ABA Section Probes Developments in EC Competition Law and
Policy, [Jan.-June] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 260 at 898 (June 27, 1991).
The other four proposed mergers were subjected to formal proceedings by the Com-
mission. Id. During this nine-month period, the Commission also issued over 100 Reg-
ulation clarifications. Id
sions regarding these proposed mergers provide a prelude to the di-
rection of EEC merger policy.
1. The First Notification and Clearance Under the Merger
Regulation
On November 7, 1990, the Commission gave its approval to a "mi-
nority cross-shareholding" agreement between French vehicle manu-
facturer Renault and its Swedish counterpart, Volvo, which had been
notified one month earlier.25 2 Although the entities were expected
to remain independent, 253 their combined sales, in excess of $50 bil-
lion, made them Europe's fourth largest industrial entity.254 Signifi-
cantly, the merger constituted the first deal to be notified to and
approved by the Commission pursuant to the Regulation. The Com-
mission determined that the portion of the merger that fell within
the Regulation "does not create or strengthen a dominant position in
any of these markets as a result of which effective competition would
be significantly impeded in the Common Market or in a substantial
part of it," and therefore cleared the merger without requiring a for-
mal investigation tinder the Regulation. 55
2. The First Clearance of a Joint Venture
The Commission cleared the first notification of a proposed joint
venture on January 7, 1991.256 The joint venture program between
Mitsubishi of Japan and Union Carbide of the United States involved
a purchase of 50 percent of Union Carbide's carbon manufacturing di-
vision by Mitsubishi.257 The Commission did not oppose the joint
venture because the "concentration does not have any significant im-
pact in the Community," and because neither Union Carbide nor Mit-
subishi intended to compete in the carbon production market.258
This notification precedentially involved two undertakings based
252. EC Commission Will Weigh Impact of Acquisition in Paper Industry, [Aug.-
Dec.] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1492, at 792 (Nov. 22, 1990).
253. The Commission did note that any further integration of the companies would
require further clearance. Id.
254. Id Their aggregate output of heavy commercial vehicles ranked first in the
world, while production of all vehicles was seventh in the world. Automakers Make
First Filing Under EC's New Merger Regime, [Aug.-Dec.] 59 Antitrust & Trade Reg.
Rep. (BNA) No. 1487, at 584 (Oct. 18, 1990). The companies designed the merger to
alleviate deficiencies in sales, operation profits and cash flow, and to achieve economies
of scale in the areas of research and development and raw materials purchases. Id.
255. EC Commission Clears First Deal Notvied Under Merger Regulation, [Jan.-
June] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1492, at 89 (Jan. 17, 1991).
256. EC Commission Clears First Joint Venture Notified Under Merger Control
Regulation, [Jan.-June] 60 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1449, at 89 (Jan. 17,
1991).
257. The stated purpose of the joint venture was to "increase market share in the
carbon and graphite products sector." Id.
258. Id.
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outside the EEC.259
3. Other Initial Clearances
Other early Commission clearances under the Regulation included
the acquisition of Carimi, an Italian steel distributor, by Usmior-
Sacilor, a French steel products producer.260 Although Usinor-
Sacilor produced the most steel products of any company within the
EEC at the time of the merger,2 6 ' the Commission cleared the pro-
posed acquisition because other steel distributors would likely meet
Usinor-Sacilor's entry into the Italian market with tough competi-
tion.262 In addition, the Commission announced its clearance of the
AT&T/NCR and Matsushita/MCA takeovers after concluding that
they would not create or strengthen dominant positions that would
significantly impede competition within the EEC.263
4. The First intensive Investigation Under the Merger
Regulation
The Commission did not undertake any detailed investigations of
notified mergers until January 21, 1991, when it announced that it
would conduct an in-depth review of a complex assets exchange pro-
posal between Alcatel, a French electronics company that manufac-
tures batteries, and Telettra, an Italian telecommunications company
259. Id.
260. Id. The Commission later approved, without undertaking a formal investiga-
tion, Usinor-Sacilor's acquisition of 40% of Associated Steel Distributors, a British dis-
tributor of steel products. EC Commission Clears First Transaction in Steel Sector
Under Merger Regulation, [Jan.-June] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1515, at
677 (May 9, 1991).
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. EC Commission Clears AT&T/NCR and Matsushita/MCA Acquisitions, [Jan.-
June] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1505, at 325-26 (Feb. 28, 1991). The
AT&T/NCR takeover involved AT&T's contested stock acquisition of NCR, the
world's twelfth largest information service company. The Commission had been con-
cerned about AT&T control of the "UNIX" operating system software, which runs the
workstations manufactured by NCR. Id. at 325. In the highly-publicized Matsushita/
MCA takeover, the Commission concentrated on the relationship between Matsu-
shita's manufacture of video and audio equipment and MCA's production of video and
audio recordings. Id. at 326. However, the Commission cleared the takeover because
an adequate number of competing producers of video and audio recordings made it un-
likely that Matsushita would obtain a dominant position at the expense of competition
within the EEC. Id. In both takeovers, however, the Commission noted that it would
pay close attention to the meitenance of competitive conditions in the EEC markets
affected by the acquisitions. Id. at 325-26.
owned by Fiat.26 4 The Commission decided to open formal proceed-
ings because of its concern that the merger would result in high mar-
ket shares in both the Spanish market for transmission equipment
and the French market for batteries.265
5. Evaluation of the Commission's Initial Merger Reviews
Although the Commission's decisions provide only a scant indica-
tion of the future of EEC merger control as 1993 approaches, there
are some noteworthy aspects which companies and their attorneys
should consider in planning European business strategy. First, the
Commission has yet to mention any non-competition factors in its de-
cisions. This may be due to the absence of any significant social or
political implications arising from these transactions. More likely,
however, it probably indicates a commitment on the part of the Com-
mission to remain faithful to the competition-oriented language of
the Regulation.2 66
Another important element of some of these decisions is the em-
phasis on the limited effect of clearance.26 7 In the Volvo/Renault
transaction, for instance, the Commission reminded the parties that
their partial integration would require further approval before it
would allow any further integration.28 Similarly, the Commission
emphasized that it conditioned clearance of the AT&T/NCR and
264. EC Commission Begins First Intense Probe of Deal Under Merger Control Reg-
ulation, [Jan.-June] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1501, at 168 (Jan. 31,
1991). Notification was made on December 10, 1990. Id.
265. Id.
266. "Concerns about the 'political dimension' of the merger regulation regime also
appear not to have materialized because the decisions clearly indicate that they are be-
ing made on competition-and not political or nationalistic--grounds .... " ABA Sec-
tion Probes Developments in EC Competition Law and Policy, (Jan.-June] 60 Antitrust
& Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1522, at 898 (June 27, 1991). See also EC Practitioners
Advise Colleagues on Pitfalls of Merger Control Regulation, [Jan.-June] 60 Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1515, at 673 (May 9, 1991) (noting that the Commission
had yet to prohibit an "extraterritorial merger on the basis of anticompetitive effects
in the Community"). Given the presence of American and Japanese companies in
these initial notifications, the Commission probably had the opportunity to consider so-
cial and political factors, such as the protection of European jobs and European-owned
companies.
267. "Since the mandate of the Commission [under the Merger Regulation] is
broader than that of the Justice Department [under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act], it can
take into account a broader range of policy considerations and is 'imposing a lot of in-
teresting conditions on mergers' cleared after scrutiny." ABA Section Probes Develop-
ments in EC Competition Law and Policy, [Jan.-June] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep.
(BNA) No. 1522, at 898 (June 27, 1991) (remarks at American Bar Association Anti-
trust Section June 17-18, 1991, meeting).
On a broader scale, one commentator suggested the Commission may use conditional
clearance as a tool to "implement its own antitrust policies and promote its own con-
ception of fairness in international markets." Callister, supra note 6, at 127.
268. EC Commission Clears First Deal Notied Under Merger Regulation, [Aug.-
Dec.] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1492, at 789 (Nov. 22, 1990).
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Matsushita/MCA takeovers upon the maintenance of competitive
conditions within the EEC in the affected industries.269 The Com-
mission's message seems to be that a merger's clearance does not give
the parties a license to abuse the advantages obtained by the transac-
tion. Also, it does not enable them to carry out any covert plans,
which the Commission may have overlooked in its investigation, that
will adversely affect competition within the EEC.270
Finally, the Commission seems to acknowledge the validity, and
even necessity, of meeting the enormous Common Market with con-
centrations in economic power. In the Mitsubishi/Union Carbide
joint venture, the Commission accepted the validity of the parties' os-
tensible intention to increase market share in the carbon and graph-
ite markets.271 In addition, the Commission recognized the need for
companies to attain economies of scale, even in purchasing power, in
the Renault/Volvo merger.272
Since it is unLikely that firms (especially smaller firms) will be able
269. EC Commission Clears AT&T/NCR and Matsushita/MCA Acquisitions, [Jan-
June] Antitrust & Trade Rag. Rep. (BNA) No. 1505, at 325-26 (Feb. 28, 1991). The
Commission has also indicated that it intends "to monitor closely future developments
in the (automobile] industry to see that competitive conditions 'are safeguarded,"' af-
ter clearing the acquisition of Ford New Holland by Italian automaker Fiat on May 2,
1991. Fiat and Ford are Expected to Move Soon After Winning Clearance By EC, [Jan.-
June] 60 Antitrust & Trade Rg. Rep. (BNA), at 678 (May 9, 1991).
270. It is unlikely that the Regulation contemplates post-clearance jurisdiction (be-
yond violations of conditional clearance under Article 8(5)(b)) in cases where the com-
petitive conditions of an affected market subsequently change, since the Commission's
statements probably do not raise to the level of a conditional clearance. Article 8(4),
which authorizes remedial measures "[w]here a concentration has already been imple-
mented," probably refers to mergers which have been consummated before the Com-
mission has rendered a decision. Council Regulation 4064/89 on the Control of
Concentrations Between Undertakings, art. 8(4), 1989 O.J. (L 395) 6-7.
If the competition conditions do change in a market affected by a merger which has
already been cleared, the Commission may be precluded from attempting to alter a
merger which it has already cleared. Most likely, the Commission will restrict its
clearances of mergers affecting markets that have become less competitive because of
mergers which were previously approved. Of course, this does create an inequity in
favor of the mergers which were earlier cleared. See id.
271. EC Commision Clears First Joint Venture Notifed Under Merger Control
Regulation, [Jan.-June] 60 Antitrust & Trade Rg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1499, at 89 (Jan. 17,
1991). In another notified merger, the Commission decided to review a proposal
whereby France's Arjomari-Prioux SA and Britain's Wiggins Teape Appleton agreed
to merge, creating the largest paper manufacturing operation in Europe. EC Commis-
sion Will Weigh Impact of Acquisition in Paper Industry, [Aug.-Dec.] 59 Antitrust &
Trade Rag. Rep. (BNA) No. 1492, at 792 (Nov. 22, 1990). Rather boldly, one company
official stated that the merger would "establish an extremely powerful merchandising
and distribution network" in Europe, as well as "achieve economies of scale." Id.
272. Automaker Make First Filing Under EC's New Regime, [Aug.-Dec.] 59 Anti-
trust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1487, at 584 (Oct. 18, 1990).
to satisfy, through internal expansion, the additional demand created
by the unification of the European markets, the Commission can ex-
pect a growing number of notified mergers, even after 1993.273 By it-
self, this trend should not negatively reflect on the validity of any
individual merger. The Regulation's brief history appears to vindi-
cate the Regulation's purpose, which is to expedite, rather than deter,
desirable mergers while preventing anticompetitive mergers.2 74
V. CONCLUSION
A. Federalism and the Common Challenge
While this article has focused on the differences between United
States and EEC merger control procedures, antitrust authorities in
both the United States and the EEC face a similar challenge to their
merger enforcement regimes. Although United States antitrust law
has emerged in an established federalist system whereby the states
give deference to the federal government in matters affecting inter-
state commerce,275 the federal government's anemic response to the
most recent wave of mergers and acquisitions has brought about in-
creased state antitrust enforcement.276 As for the EEC, the Merger
Regulation has emerged in an environment where the Member
States have never willingly deferred to the EEC.277
1. United States Antitrust Enforcement Trends
Traditionally, U. S. states have left the bulk of antitrust enforce-
ment to the federal government for primarily two reasons. First, the
Commerce Clause has a broad interpretation. Second, the federal
government has greater resources and expertise.278 However, the
concurrent onset of federal antitrust deregulation and increased
merger activity in the 1980's has pressured popularly elected State
273. Callister, supra note 6, at 132.
274. The Commission's view toward mergers was aptly expressed by a Commission
official prior to the implementation of the Regulation. He stated that "[ilt is not a sin
to merger, but it is a sin to abuse a dominant position." EC Commission Approves No-
trication Rules for New Merger Regulation Effective Sept. 21, [Aug.-Dec.] 59 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA), at 1196 (Aug. 1, 1990).
275. See infra notes 277-84 and accompanying text.
276. See Stephen M. Axinn & Mark A. Glick, Dual Enforcement of Merger Law in
the EEC Lessons from the American Experience, in 1989 FORDHAM CORPORATE LAW
INSTITUTE: 1992 & EEC/U.S. COMPETITION AND TRADE LAw 547 (B. Hawk ed., 1990).
277. "When the merger regulation was adopted .... practitioners predicted a 'sort
of guerilla warfare' as Commission and national authorities squabbled over jurisdiction
to review certain mergers." EC Practitioners Advise Colleagues on Pi(falls of Merger
Control Regulation, [Jan.-June] 60 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1515, at 673
(May 9, 1991).
278. Axinn & Glick, supra note 277, at 566. This domination by the federal govern-
ment has also allowed Congress to pass antitrust legislation without the need to pre-
empt concurrent state law. Id. at 551.
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Attorneys General to increase state antitrust enforcement.279 The
prospect of facing a multitude of state and federal antitrust laws has
raised concern that the added cost and legal uncertainty of mergers
and acquisitions will prevent competitively desirable mergers from
being consummated.280 Fortunately, the long-standing national iden-
tity and coordination between states and the federal government is
likely to outlive the current cycle of merger activity. This should oc-
cur despite the recent policies of the federal government, and with-
out any permanent damage to the United States antitrust
enforcement structure or the United States economy.
2. European Antitrust Enforcement trends
On the other hand, European national and EEC antitrust legisla-
tion has not been incorporated into such an established federalist
structure. This explains why the Commission has demanded exclu-
sive jurisdiction rather than a federalist jurisdictional structure.
Although the Treaty of Rome contains specific provisions for the
supremacy of EEC law over national law,28 1 the Member States have
not usually been willing to relinquish power to the EEC.282 In terms
of merger enforcement, this power struggle has created the same
concern that exists regarding United States mergers and acquisi-
tions,283 even with the Merger Regulation in place. Furthermore, the
EEC lacks a tradition of Community identity, which has been hin-
dered by the Member States' reluctance to subordinate their sover-
eignty.2 8 4 As a result, the EEC does not have a proven federalist
framework of cooperation and deference where parallel enforcement
of supra-national mergers is likely to succeed.28 5
If the Commission adopts the recent deregulatory policy of the
279. 1& at 566.
280. Id, at 567. See also ABA Section Probes Developments in EC Competition Law
and Policy, [Jan.-June] 60 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1522, at 897 (June
27, 1991). "'As Europe moves towards a more unitary competition policy, the U.S.
commences Balkanization of its own policy. As Europe moves forward, the U.S. moves
backward.'" I (quoting former Federal Trade Commissioner Terry Calvini).
281. Article 87(2)(e) authorizes the Council to implement regulations and directives
defining the relationship between EEC and Member States antitrust legislation. EEC
TREATY, art. 87(2)(e). Article 235 authorizes the Council to take any measures which
further Community objectives. Id art. 235. In addition, the Court of Justice has held
that these articles give EEC law precedence over nation law. See Case 14/68, Wilhelm
v. Bundeskartellamt, 1969 E.C.R. 1, 14.
282. See Axinn & Glick, supra note 277, at 558-59.
283. Id, at 547.
284. Id, at 549, 570.
285. 1I at 569-70.
United States federal government during a period of heightened
merger activity, the present jurisdictional structure is unlikely to
withstand the pressures created by increased national enforce-
ment. 28 6 Thus, any hope of a consistent merger policy within the
EEC will be realized only if the Member States relinquish the pres-
ent multi-tiered merger enforcement system287and provide the EEC
with truly exclusive jurisdiction over all cross-border mergers and
acquisitions.
B. Prognosis for EEC Competition Policy Under the Regulation
Although the Regulation is not perfect, it provides a strong founda-
tion upon which to build a European merger policy that will contrib-
ute to the economic and social cohesion of the EEC. In addition, the
Regulation significantly improves the procedural and substantive ad-
ministration of antitrust law by the EEC institutions.
However, the Regulation is only a framework. Thus, its success,
and its contribution to the success of the EEC, will depend upon how
well the Commission can walk the fine line between external pres-
sure from the Member States and the individual proponents of
merger proposals, and excessive reliance on the literal language of
the Regulation itself. Like a blueprint, the Regulation provisions
should guide the Commission in developing a merger policy that ad-
heres to the spirit of the Treaty of Rome.
EARL RAY BEEMAN
286. "'While the number of direct clashes between national and Community au-
thorities may be few, such double control will run counter to the logic of the Single
Market. Industrial adaptation, it seems, will take place in a climate of uncertainty.'"
UK, German Postures on EC Merger Control Can Lead to Two-Tiered Review of Merg-
ers, Jan.-July] 60 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 56, at 937 (June 29, 1989)
(quoting Royal Institute of International Affairs discussion paper).
287. See supra notes 156-66 and accompanying text.
